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Abstract 
Conflicts over transboundary freshwater resources arise, to a large degree, because 
property rights are not clearly defined. International water law provides only hints and 
suggestions as to how states should resolve their water disputes—legal principles and 
clauses are rather ambiguous and contradictory. But conflict creates the need for 
cooperation, achieved by means of negotiations, and the specific outcome of 
negotiations is almost always codified in an international treaty. While this work 
discusses and analyzes the broader aspects of conflict and cooperation over international 
fresh water, it specifically investigates bilateral water agreements for rivers with 
specific geographical configurations and aims to answer a fundamental question: how 
and why bilateral treaties vary in their design? In fact, by considering actual treaties, 
one can “back out” the implicit property right. (For example, if a downstream state pays 
an upstream state to reduce its pollution, it can be said that the no harm principle does 
not stand). This paper will examine international freshwater treaties to deduce the nature 
of treaty remedies used for resolving conflict for rivers shared by two countries. 
Geography and economics are the main variables used to explore treaty design. This 
work is important not only because it investigates how particular variables determine 
different outcomes (by means of hypotheses testing). It will also tell us how 
international legal principles and property right conflicts are expressed and negotiated in 
practice and will therefore have implications for the resolution of ongoing or future 
interstate conflicts over a given river.  
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Patterns of Engagement: How States Negotiate International Water 
Agreements   
Shlomi Dinar 
1.Introduction 
Of all the transboundary environmental problems that might be studied empirically, freshwater is 
unique in that the same kinds of problems occur throughout the world. There is only one ozone 
depletion game, and just a single climate change observation, but there are many international 
freshwater problems that have similar features. To be sure, each such problem is unique in the 
details. For example, some river basins are made up of rich upstream states and poor downstream 
states, which may add to the complexity of the hydropolitical situation. However, many are 
similar enough that the outcomes associated with them can be compared. In particular, there are 
currently over 200 documented international river basins, 176 of which are shared by only two 
states (Wolf, Natharius, Danielson, Ward and Pender, 1999: 424). 
 When rivers and other water bodies transverse or divide countries, transboundary 
externalities often arise, creating conflict. The source of the conflict is not just that one country 
harms another but, more importantly, that international water law defines property rights and 
responsibilities only vaguely and does not provide states with specific guidelines for negotiation. 
At the same time, conflict creates the need for cooperation, and cooperation is almost always 
codified in an international treaty. The following work is an inquiry into the nature of the conflict 
that can arise, and of the treaty remedies used for resolving conflict, for rivers shared by two 
countries. Since international water law provides only broad guidelines as to how states should 
resolve their water disputes and differing utilization plans for a given river, this analysis is 
interested in investigating actual negotiations between states over shared water resources, 
exploring the intricacies of the water treaties states negotiate.  
The agreements analyzed by this paper were ascertained from different international 
depositories and were taken from a number of sources including: Oregon State’s Treaties 
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Database1, League of Nations Treaty Series, United Nations Treaty Series, United Nations 
Treaty Website2, The Consolidated Treaty Series3, United States Treaties in Force (Treaties and 
Other International Agreements)4, Food and Agriculture Organization Treaty Index (FAOLEX)5, 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe6, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Treaty 
Website7, Repetorio Cronologico de Legislacion—Spain, Department of Civil Engineering of the 
University of Texas8, and the World Treaty Index9. Other treaties were collected through 
respective governments. In the case of the World Treaty Index and the United States Treaties in 
Force, for example, the treaty title was identified yet the text of the agreement was obtained 
elsewhere.  
Specifically, the work is interested in exploring if the observed variation in treaty 
outcomes can be explained by differences in geography and economics. In particular I shall test 
hypotheses regarding cost-sharing patterns and the transfer of side-payments between parties to 
ameliorate pollution problems and resolve disputes over flood control, hydropower and water 
allocation. Side-payments provide perhaps the clearest means by which to evaluate agreements 
as they are quite often visibly specified in an agreement. In fact, while I have investigated over 
25010 agreements corresponding to different rivers, I am only interested in specific agreements 
that refer to a particular conflict addressed by the agreement. By looking at specific agreements, 
I will show that side-payments do not conform to the extreme legal principles so often 
advocated—rather compromises are often negotiated. And yet the allocation is not random. 
Regularities emerge in the data. The location of the riparians is especially important, though it is 
not the only important determinant of side-payments. This research is, thus, not only important in 
its own right, showing how international agreements have resolved water conflicts in the past. It 
will also suggest precedent for the resolution of pending and future conflicts. 
 As I alluded to above, the main interest of this research is to investigate the relationship 
between the geographical configuration of a given river shared between two states and 
                                                 
1
 http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/projects/internationalDB.html  
2
 http://untreaty.un.org; but also special thanks to the UN Treaty Department and Andri Kolomoets (Database 
Consultant) who provided all the bilateral water agreements registered with the United Nations.     
3
 Parry, C. (Ed.) The Consolidated Treaty Series, (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1969).  
4
 United States Department of State, Treaties in Force: A list of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the 
US in Force on January 1, 2001.  
5
 http://faolex.fao.org/faolex/  
6
 UNECE, Transboundary Water Cooperation in the Newly Independent States, Moscow-Geneva, 2003.  
7
 http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/BASIS/pacte/webext/bilat/sf  
8
 http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/central_asia_regional_water.htm  
9
 Rohn, P.H., World Treaty Index, 2nd edition (ABC-Clio Information Services, Santa Barbara, California and Oxford, 
1984). 
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differences in treaty design. As Mark Giordano has argued: “the commons problem is in many 
respects geographic in nature, in that the phenomenon is predicated on the relationship between 
the spatial domains of resources and resource users.” (Giordano, 2003: 365). It is therefore the 
goal of this research to investigate if the location of state on a river and the geographical 
configuration of the river—the most rudimentary elements of the relationship between a resource 
and the resource users—result in different commons regimes.  
A quick survey of the past literature reveals that the conventional model of a 
transboundary river has an upstream and a downstream state. As such, the literature has only 
focused on a subset of rivers. But rivers flow in many different forms. From the 176 documented 
river basins that are shared by two states (Wolf, Natharius, Danielson, Ward and Pender, 1999: 
424) and only two states, this study has thus far identified 226 rivers (the study has also 
identified other rivers not documented by the above source) and thirteen types of geographical 
configurations or configurations (see Appendix A). My research, however, focuses on only two 
extreme types: the through-border river that flows from one country into another, crossing the 
border only once, and the border-creator river, which divides countries without ever crossing 
their territorial boundary.11 The two configurations are diagramed below in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Two Pure Configurations 
 
Through-Border Configuration     Border-Creator Configuration   
                                 River and flow direction 
State A              State A 
         
   
         
  Border  
State B               State B 
                                                                                                                                                             
10
 Some of these agreements were counted according to the number of rivers they referred to. So the actual number 
of individual agreements may be a bit smaller. 
11
 Not necessarily referring to the border creating and border crossing bilateral river configurations described here, 
Frey (1993: 55) draws a distinction between international and transnational river systems. The former refers to rivers 
that form the boundaries between two or more nations (Rio Grande, Shatt al-Arab) and the latter to rivers that flow 
across international boundaries (Euphrates River), creating upstream and downstream riparians. For a rigorous 
investigation of the non-pure configurations see Dinar (2004). 
 4
The reasons for choosing the two configurations are twofold. First, I want to test 
differences between river geographies. A geographically asymmetric relationship exists in the 
through-border configuration. (The working assumption is that upstream country A can harm 
downstream country B’s part of the river but not vice versa.)12 A geographically symmetric 
relationship exists in the border-creator configuration. (Any state that engages in a harming 
activity may harm not only the other state but also itself. Also, harm can be reciprocated). Given 
that the two configurations are different, testing corresponding hypotheses can be undertaken in a 
relatively methodical and systematic manner and multiple observations can be used for the same 
type of configuration. Second, all rivers share features of the “pure” geographical configurations. 
Thus, while mother-nature does not create all rivers as through-border or border-creator, as 
Appendix A clearly demonstrates, all shared rivers have properties of each of these distinct 
configurations. I will expound on the differences between these two configurations and their 
implications throughout the paper. 
 Below I will consider the more general issue of conflict and cooperation over 
international water in the scope of international relations, emphasizing the role of scarcity in 
fostering both interstate conflict and cooperation. I also argue how strategic tools such as side-
payments, issue-linkage, and reciprocity may be incorporated in fostering cooperation. While 
this discussion does not constitute the main thrust of this paper, it is important for understanding 
the more basic notion of why treaties are negotiated at all and provides the appropriate setting for 
discussing the issue of treaty design.  
As such, in the proceeding section I will consider the role of side-payments in the context 
of treaty design and property right conflicts and develop testable hypotheses. I will then review 
the results obtained from an analysis of thirty-nine specific treaties corresponding to the through-
border configuration and nine specific agreements corresponding to the border-creator 
configuration in testing the theory and hypotheses. I also apply the theory and hypothesis to the 
outlying data—the non-pure configurations—about 50 specific agreements.   
                                                 
12
 This is a prototyipical case. But there are instances where dams built downstream cause inundation or 
environmental damage upstream. I note this phenomenon later in the paper.  
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2. Conflict and Cooperation Over International Rivers: An IR and 
Hydropolitical Perspective  
2.1. Water Scarcity: Driving Conflict but also Cooperation 
According to Elhance, hydropolitics is the systematic study of conflict and cooperation between 
states over water resources that transcend international borders (1999:3). The hydrology of an 
international river basin links all the riparian states sharing it in a complex network of 
environmental, economic, political and security interdependencies, in the process creating the 
potential for interstate conflict as well as opportunities for cooperation among the states 
(Elhance, 1999: 13).  
In arid regions, especially, countries may utilize the waters of their shared rivers for 
domestic water consumption. Water scarcity is therefore reflected in the water shortages felt by a 
given country intensified by the conflicting uses that may ensue among countries vis-à-vis the 
shared body of water. Falkenmark has argued that environmental stress develops when the 
population grows large in relation to the water supplied from the global water cycle. As such, 
conflicts may easily be generated when users are competing for a limited amount of water to 
supply the domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors (Falkenmark, 1992: 279-280). 
Falkenmark has also argued that 1,000 cubic meters of water per capita per year constitutes the 
minimum necessary for an adequate quality of life in a moderately developed country (1986: 
192-200). When water availability drops below this figure, scarcity problems become intense. As 
water scarcity, and environmental scarcity in general, become more acute, violent conflict 
becomes more probable. The link transcends such issues as constrained agricultural and 
economic activity, migration, greater segmentation of society, and disruption of institutions 
(Homer-Dixon, 1999: 80). A multitude of conflicts can develop, ranging from the individual 
level to the country level (Falkenmark, 1992: 292).   
Similarly, whether in arid or non-arid regions, countries may also want to utilize their 
shared waters for the creation of hydroelectricity, flood control or pollution abatement benefits. 
In pollution cases, for example, the cost of water pollution is often borne by the downstream 
riparians, contributing to a renewed lack of international cooperation (Kratz, 1996: 26). All in all, 
countries may suffer from scarcity in water supply, energy, flood prevention facilities or 
pollution control and are, therefore, apt to utilize and exploit an international river creating 
conflict between the riparians. Choucri and North (1975) have further argued that countries 
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facing high resource demands and limited resource availability would seek the needed resources 
through trade or conquest. According to the authors’ lateral pressure theory, when national 
capabilities (including resources) cannot be attained at a reasonable cost within national 
boundaries, they may be sought beyond (Choucri and North, 1975: 16). This argument is also 
related to the water-war thesis, which argues that water disputes, driven by water scarcity and 
resource capture between states are likely to lead to interstate war (Cooley, 1984; Starr, 1991).  
That said, for the same reasons that scarcity can lead to interstate conflict, it can also lead 
to cooperation. Attempting to ameliorate scarcity or to exploit a given river so as to satiate a 
particular need, whether it is water quantity or hydroelectricity, can drive states to cooperate for 
their mutual benefit. As Deudney has argued, resource scarcity based on environmental 
degradation tends to encourage joint efforts to halt the degradation (1991:10).  
With regards to the water-war thesis, Wolf (1998) has documented the results of a 
systematic searching for interstate violence that involved water specifically as a scarce and/or 
consumable resource and found only one true water war—4500 years ago—along with only 
seven cases of acute water-related violence. As Wolf and Hamner have noted in a survey of 
hundreds of non-navigational water treaties: “…the more valuable lesson of international water 
is as a resource whose characteristics tend to induce cooperation.” (Wolf and Hamner, 2000:66). 
Homer Dixon (1999: 141) has likewise argued that historic and contemporary evidence shows 
that violent conflict related to river water is almost always internal rather than international.  
As such international water issues seldom turn violent, yet this is not to say that 
international disputes do not take place over water. However, just as water may be an impetus for 
disputes among states, it is often a catalyst for international cooperation. As even Choucri and 
North claim in articulating their lateral pressure theory, one method of increasing capabilities 
(including resources) is to secure favorable alliances. Alliances, treaties, and other international 
compacts are frequently concluded to end or moderate conflicts of interest. Such bonds usually 
imply the pooling of some capabilities for the maintenance of shared interests (1975:21, 219). In 
short environmental disparities modify the meaning of ecological interdependence whereby 
“states and groups of states will try to seek alliances as they try to exploit or to escape these 
disparities.”(Brock, 1992:99) As Dokken argues, in some cases such environmental scarcities 
and environmental problems may be considered the starting points for cooperation (Dokken, 
1997).  
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2.2. Realism, Neo-Realism, Liberalism and Neo-Liberal Institutionalism: 
Understanding the Larger Context of Conflict and Cooperation  
The dilemma between conflict and cooperation so common in international river basins may be 
understood in the larger context of several international relations theories, which offer alternative 
explanations as to why states may elect to cooperate in some instances and not others.   
Realists and neo-realists argue that the anarchical nature of the international system 
implores states to care for their survival (Morgenthau, 1967; Greico, 1990: 38). States are also 
preoccupied with the gains of other states relative to their own gains in addition to their concerns 
about survival (Greico, 1990: 28; Waltz, 1979: 105). States often fail to cooperate even when 
they have common interests (Gilpin, 1975: 34 and 26). Thus, scarcity may provide additional 
impetus for conflict. If cooperation does emerge it is often a reflection of the distribution of 
power among states (Greico, 1990: 47; Mearsheimer, 1994/1995: 7). States cooperate when 
cooperation serves the interests of the most powerful state that takes the initiative in formulating 
a cooperative regime. Otherwise known as hegemonic stability theory, the theory predicts that 
cooperation will take place only in the presence of a hegemon and only if that hegemon chooses 
to formulate a cooperative regime.  
Opposite the realist and neo-realist schools, is a less glum view of the emergence of 
cooperation—the liberal and neo-liberal institutionalist schools. According to these schools, 
states are rational egoists and will therefore cooperate if they stand to gain from cooperation and 
have mutual interests. Scarcity or the need to exploit a shared river may provide the impetus for 
this coordination of efforts. Furthermore, it is the prospects of cheating and not the relative gains 
dilemma that often curtails cooperation. In fact, cooperation and attempts at mitigating cheating 
often depend on the creation of institutional arrangements among states. Therefore, the 
emergence of cooperation among parties is possible when compliance problems and mistrust 
among parties are mitigated with the assistance of institutions that generate information, lower 
transaction costs, increase transparency and reduce uncertainty (Keohane, 1982: 338). According 
to neo-liberal institutionalists not only will cooperation ensue once mistrust and cheating is 
alleviated but states will also not be deterred by relative gains, as their main concern is with 
absolute gains (Axelrod, 1984: 14; Lipson, 1984: 2 and 5; Stein, 1990: 46).  
2.2.1. Strategic Interaction: Side-payments, Reciprocity, and Issue-linkage 
Acknowledging the realist assumptions—self-interest and sovereignty—that would otherwise 
impede cooperation, but arguing from a neo-liberal standpoint that unilateralism often fails to 
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sustain a mutually satisfying outcome and that cheating often curtails cooperation, Barrett (2003) 
has claimed that the key to cooperation and treaty formation (regimes and institutions) is self-
enforcement. In a way Barrett has attempted to operationalize institutions and cooperative 
arrangements, explaining not only how these agreements may come about but also how they may 
prove to be successful, by including a strategic-interaction approach to cooperation and treaty 
making. Perhaps most instructive about Barrett’s theory in terms of cooperation is that for an 
international treaty to be self-enforcing and successful it must be able to restructure incentives in 
order to succeed in altering the behavior of the parties. According to Barrett, strategy has many 
means of effecting behavior, one of them being altering incentives of the parties to cooperate 
through the use of side-payments. In fact, side-payments may be most compelling with regards to 
cooperation among asymmetric countries (Barrett, 2003: xv, 338-340, 351).  
Concern about the future, or the shadow of the future, also helps to promote cooperation 
and altering payoffs (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 232; Oye, 1986:12-18). This is especially true 
in iterated games as opposed to single-play games (Jervis, 1977:5). In the absence of continuing 
interaction between the parties, defection would emerge as the dominant strategy. Retaliation 
targeted at the defecting party can’t be employed in the single-play game given that no other 
opportunities for interaction are expected. Iterated games also permit the parties to resort to the 
strategy of reciprocity whereby a promise to respond to present cooperation with future 
cooperation and a threat to respond to present defection with future defection can improve the 
prospects for cooperation (Oye, 1986: 15; Axelrod, 1984:13-31).  
Issue linkage is another strategy that may be used in fostering cooperation and altering 
payoffs (Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff, 1998:12). Issue linkage involves attempts to gain 
bargaining leverage on a given issue contingent on the other party’s actions towards another 
perhaps unrelated issue (Haas, 1980: 372). Parties’ resources may differ, so that it makes sense to 
trade one for another. Referred to as ‘issue aggregation’ by Hopmann, this process entails linking 
asymmetric issues among parties such that one country has intense feelings for one issue while 
another party has intense feelings for the other issue, providing a ripe environment for tradeoffs 
(1998:81).  
Although issue-linkage and reciprocity are important strategies for fostering cooperation 
along international rivers, and will be discussed in some detail below, the main interest of this 
paper is the use of side-payments in affecting behavior.  
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2.3. Conflict and Cooperation: The Hydropolitical Context 
Despite realist and neo-realist concerns, cooperation in the international arena is not an anomaly. 
One need only consider the example of international rivers, to realize that cooperation takes 
place between states.   
In fact as the section below will argue, 1) states will cooperate if it is in their mutual 
benefit, 2) states are concerned with maximizing their benefits and will cooperate if regimes 
and/or agreements are self-enforcing or if cooperation can provide for mutual gains, and finally 
3) cooperation does not depend on hegemony but rather on voluntary contracting among states; 
yet if a hegemon is part of the negotiations it is seldom a coercive actor.  
In fact, as the discussion below will argue, given the nature of international rivers states 
will elect to cooperate when they can realize immediate or future mutual gains from cooperation 
(given scarcity or the need to exploit a shared river) and when the treaties they negotiate are able 
to restructure the incentives to cooperate. The literature on strategic interaction is therefore 
instrumental in understanding why agreements and regimes take shape on international river 
basins. Specifically, one need delve even deeper into the hydropolitical context to explore the 
incentives and disincentives to cooperation.  
2.3.1. Geography of a River 
The basic starting point for contemplating the hydropolitical cooperation dilemma often rests in 
the river itself. The imposition of political boundaries on rivers creates different geographical 
relationships between basin countries, which often provide different incentives for cooperation. 
Following the main thrust of this work, and as introduced earlier, it is possible to divide 
international rivers into two pure and extreme configurations: the through-border configuration 
and the border-creator configuration.  
Juxtaposing the through-border configuration against the border-creator configuration 
may be very informative in assessing the potential for cooperation over international rivers given 
that they are opposite configurations. In fact, the hydropolitical literature has consistently pointed 
to geography and especially the geographic discrepancies between upstream and downstream 
states as to why particular water conflicts have not been solved  (Gottmann, 1951: 159; 
Falkenmark, 1990: 184). It is by no means certain that conflict in the use of border-creator rivers 
can be avoided (Falkenmark, 1986: 96), but the geography of border-creator rivers helps by 
facilitating retaliation and reciprocity.  
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LeMarquand (1977) presents perhaps the first analysis that speculates about different 
river geographies specific to the potential for conflict and cooperation over a shared water body. 
According to LeMarquand (1977:8) successive rivers (upstream/downstream situations) and 
contiguous rivers (where the river creates the boundary between the countries) create different 
incentives or disincentives for cooperation. While LeMarquand does not necessarily distinguish 
between the pure through-border and border-creator configurations, which I investigate, he 
makes two distinct conclusions about possible outcomes for conflict and cooperation based on 
the two river geographies.  According to LeMarquand, there is significant incentive for 
cooperation when the river is contiguous—the incentive to reach agreement is to avoid the 
“tragedy of the commons” (LeMarquand, 1977:9). Alternatively, there is no incentive for 
cooperation when the upstream country uses the river water to the detriment of the downstream 
country and that country has no reciprocal power over the upstream country (LeMarquand, 
1977:10).    
2.3.2. Geography and Aggregate Power 
If we follow LeMarquand’s (1977) geographical argument to its logical conclusion, we would 
not expect an upstream country that may be using an international river to the detriment of the 
downstream state to cooperate at all in utilizing the international river. To be fair, LeMarquand 
does argue that a downstream state will need to utilize some reciprocal power to sway the 
upstream state to cooperate which motivates the following discussion about aggregate power 
(military and economic power) that can be used to offset the geographical advantage of upstream 
states. In fact, if we incorporate some element of aggregate power into the hydropolitical 
equation we are then able to better understand how cooperation may ensue in upstream-
downstream situations.    
Although imbalances in power relationships among states have been argued by some in 
the hydropolitics literature to impede cooperation (Just and Netanyahu, 1998:9; Hijri and Grey, 
1998:89), a variant of hegemonic stability theory has been regularly applied in the hydropolitics 
literature to explain cooperation over shared waters.  Lowi (1993) has been the main advocate of 
this implication. According to Lowi, the interest of the hegemonic state along a river is often a 
prerequisite to cooperation. But cooperation is more likely to ensue if the hegemon is located in a 
strategically inferior position—downstream—and if the hegemon’s relationship to the water 
resources is that of critical need. Conversely, cooperation will not be forthcoming if the hegemon 
is upstream since it holds the strategic geographical position.  
 11
Lowi’s (1993) hydropolitical variant of hegemonic stability theory suggests, therefore, 
that an upstream hegemon will have little incentive to cooperate on an international river. It also 
suggests that hegemonic downstream powers may be able to impose certain arrangements on 
weaker riparians or not require their consent in formulating these arrangements.  
The example of the 1973 Colorado River Treaty (not discussed by Lowi) challenges 
Lowi’s contention. The United States was both the hegemonic state and upstream and should 
have had no incentive to cooperate with Mexico or come to an agreement over their shared river. 
Contrary to the predictions of Lowi’s variant of hegemonic stability theory, the United States not 
only entered into an agreement with Mexico but also paid for the costs of desalinating the waters 
of the Colorado flowing into Mexico. Given the Colorado River example, we must therefore 
conclude that cooperation in international rivers requires explanations that go beyond pure 
strategic local, power politics and economic incentives. In short, hegemonic and similar realist 
explanations do not take into account strategic interactions between states that espouse such 
concepts as issue-linkage, reciprocity and the role of side-payments in altering a state’s payoffs, 
making it more inclined to cooperate.  
2.3.3. Reciprocity and Issue Linkage 
States, while obviously in a position to do so, do not always exploit their strategic location on a 
river or their aggregate power to the detriment of the downstream state by electing not to 
cooperate. There are several reasons that explain this phenomenon; the main one being Elhance’s 
(1999) and the neo-liberal contention that unilateralism often fails to sustain a satisfying 
outcome. Geography may play a role too but, as discussed above, cooperation may also be a 
product of reciprocity and issue linkage. For, example countries may share more than one river 
with another country. As such, a country would not want its strategic behavior on one river to be 
reciprocated with strategic behavior by the other country on another river.  
Foreign policy considerations may also help to promote cooperation when otherwise not 
expected, offsetting the temptation of upstream states to reject cooperation. LeMarquand has 
made this specific argument in the context of the Colorado River (1977:12-14). According to 
LeMarquand, the economic incentives to remove the salt from the waters of the Colorado River 
delivered to Mexico were considered uneconomical for the United States. However, not only did 
the United States not want to be considered a belligerent bully in the eyes of its southern 
neighbor and the rest of Latin America by rejecting cooperation but also considered cooperation 
on the water issue as a form of gaining cooperation and support on other fronts (LeMarquand, 
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1977: 46). By cooperating, the United States was hoping to build a ‘reservoir of goodwill,’ which 
would be reciprocated by Mexico in some fashion.     
2.3.4. The Role of Side-Payments in Inducing Cooperation 
Upstream states don’t only cooperate with downstream states because they are concerned about 
their national image or share a spectrum of issues with the downstream country, which generate a 
level of reciprocity and issue linkage. States will cooperate when taking the unilateral route over 
the cooperative route provides no or little benefits.  
But a related motivation for the upstream country to reach agreement on projects such as 
hydropower and flood control with a downstream country, which provide benefits to both 
countries, is derived from the notion that regulation of the river will generally provide external 
benefits downstream to which the upstream country will not receive compensation if an 
agreement is not negotiated (LeMarquand, 1977: 9).  
Weaker and smaller upstream states can be even more handsomely rewarded by more 
powerful and larger downstream states that wish to exploit the river basin. While the weaker 
upstream country may not have the sufficient needs or capabilities to exploit the river basin to its 
advantage, the more powerful downstream state does. Where regulation of the river for flood 
control and hydropower purposes is sought and the majority of the facilities need be built 
upstream, upstream states may take advantage of the situation agreeing to cooperate in exchange 
for some kind of compensation whether it be side-payments or in-kind (through projects that will 
be of immense benefit but will be largely funded by the downstream country). The upstream 
state will therefore incur little if any capital costs for the project but will gain particular benefits 
as a prerequisite for providing its territory for the project.  
Negative externality problems created upstream and felt far downstream from where they 
originated are naturally exacerbated in the through-border configuration. An upstream state may 
have little incentive to cooperate in abating the pollution since it is strategically located, the 
source of the pollution, and given that the externality is not reciprocal but rather unidirectional in 
the downstream direction. Besides issue-linkage, side-payments may also figure into this 
geographically asymmetric relationship, as downstream states will need to provide some sort of 
incentive for the upstream state to abate the pollution.   
A final scenario where an upstream state is likely to cooperate concerns a cooperative 
agreement over a project that is built mostly for the benefit of the downstream state in the 
upstream states’ territory or a project that is built in the downstream country but causes harm 
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upstream. Like in the above cases, cooperation will only be forthcoming when compensation is 
given from the downstream states to the upstream state (LeMarquand, 1977: 10).  
That said, Appendix B provides a game-theoretic representation of a dispute between two 
states sharing an international river and a second representation of how side-payments may 
induce parties along a through-border river to cooperate. 
With the larger context now set I pursue the notion of side-payments not only in relation 
to cooperation but also with regards to property right disputes. 
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3. Treaties, Property Right Conflicts, and International Water Law 
In this section I am interested in explaining how treaties differ in their design. That is, I am 
interested in how conflicting interests and uses on international watercourses are negotiated 
between states. International water law is vague and general, providing states with no clear rules 
of how to solve property right conflicts. It is therefore by analyzing the actual treaties that one is 
able to “back out” the negotiated outcome and the impending property right solution.  
As I will argue in this section, some of the same variables that were discussed above—
namely side-payments—which provide the necessary incentives to make cooperation possible, 
will also be instrumental in guiding the analysis on how treaties differ in their design. As Barrett 
has marked, side-payments ‘ratchet up’ the cooperation problem by inducing states that may 
have otherwise not cooperated to cooperate. In addition, “side-payments may reflect an implicit 
agreement about property rights.” (Barrett, 2003:357).  Considering the side-payment 
arrangement negotiated in an international agreement will tell us which state has the property 
right do what and how extreme legal principles are reconciled. For example, if a downstream 
state pays an upstream state to abate pollution, we can back out from this agreement that the no 
harm principle does not stand. Side-payments are also the most direct and easiest way to detect 
how property right conflicts are resolved because they can be ascertained by reading the 
agreement. This section will also consider the cost–sharing patterns negotiated among the 
parties.   
Below I begin with a short discussion on property rights and discuss the role of 
international water law in resolving water disputes. In line with the main theme of this paper, I 
then delve deeper into the relationship between the geographical configuration of a given river 
and the side-payment and cost-sharing game played between states as they conclude a set 
agreement and resolve a property right conflict.  As I argue, however, while geography is an 
important variable for explaining how property right conflicts are resolved, economic differences 
between the states also play a role in this determination.   
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3.1. Property Rights and International Water Law: Poorly Defined and Unclear 
3.1.1. Coase Theorem 
The Coase theorem tells us that, given any initial allocation of rights, no transaction costs, and 
the ability of countries to negotiate and enforce redistributions of rights, final allocations of 
resources will be efficient (Coase, 1960). The location of the state is unimportant to the Coase 
theorem. Whether the upstream state has the right to pollute or the downstream state has the right 
not to be harmed, the final allocation will be the same—that is if the victim had the right to a 
clean environment then the polluter would pay the victim to accept that level of pollution at a 
point where the marginal benefit to the polluter of an additional increment of production would 
equal the marginal cost to the victim of an additional increment of pollution. Conversely, if the 
polluter had a right to pollute then the victim would have to pay the polluter to abate the 
pollution at a point where the marginal benefit of another increment of cleanliness would equal 
the marginal costs of the foregone production (Coase, 1960:2-8). As I shall argue location plays 
an important role in who pays for the abatement of pollution in international rivers. 
The Coase theorem is not really relevant to international rivers given other 
considerations. For example, the Coase theorem takes as given an initial allocation of rights. 
Similarly, Coase presumed the existence of judges and governments (basically a domestic 
setting) being able to assign and reassign property rights, which assumes some kind of central 
authority.  In the international arena, this is not the case, as no central authority exists to enforce 
international contracts. Similarly transaction costs are often greater than zero.  
3.1.2. International Water Law 
The above discussion reinforces the idea that conflict on international watercourses arises 
because property rights are not clearly defined. For example, if the property right belonged to the 
upstream state, it could do what it wants regardless of harm to the downstream state—in the 
water lingo this is known as the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty. Conversely, if the 
property right belonged to the downstream state, it would have a right not to be harmed by the 
upstream state—the principle of absolute territorial integrity.  
Both Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and 
Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development recognize this conflict 
but do little to resolve it. Even if it is agreed that both the Stockholm and Rio Declarations 
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support a compromise by juxtaposing both extreme principles against one another, one is still 
struck by the vagueness of this compromise.  
Over the years there has been an attempt to Draft a convention solely pertaining to the 
non-navigational utilization of international watercourses. In 1997 the United Nations adopted 
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The Convention is a 
general framework agreement containing numerous articles developed for use by states in 
resolving their common water disputes. The Convention, however, was never “ratified, accepted, 
approved or acceded to” by a sufficient number of states and never entered into force. As of 
August 2002, only 12 out of 35 countries needed for the Convention to enter into force have 
ratified. The deadline for ratification has long passed.  
The Convention nonetheless emphasizes two main principles. The first, Article 5, 
promotes the equitable and reasonable utilization principle—the so-called compromise principle 
between the two extreme principles discussed above. The second, Article 7, is the obligation not 
to cause significant harm principle.   
Since the Convention was adopted in 1997, international legal scholars have argued that 
Article 5 takes priority over Article 7 (McCaffrey, 2001: 308-310). As McCaffery has argued, 
“..in the field of international water courses it is not the causing of significant harm per se, but 
the unreasonable causing of such harm that is prohibited.” (McCaffrey, 2001: 370-371). Yet as 
implied above, the emphasis on equitable and reasonable utilization has not meant a lot for 
states in conflict over an international river. It only suggests increased support for reconciling the 
various interests of river basin states in the development of their shared waters (Wouters, 
1997:xxiv). At the same time, equitable and reasonable utilization must also contend with the 
obligation not to cause significant harm.  
To be fair, although the Convention has stirred some controversy among states, which 
may favor one article over another, it does not attempt to provide countries with specific 
guidelines for dispute resolution. Rather the Convention attempts to codify customary law in the 
most general terms. It is an umbrella convention and does not pretend to replace individual 
agreements negotiated between countries over specific disputes. As Barrett has observed, custom 
gives expression to this need for restraint and treaties impose further constraints and apply them 
with greater specificity.” (Barrett, 2003: 110) It is in existing agreements, therefore, that we may 
detect how states specifically go about reconciling conflicting interests in developing water 
resources or solving transboundary pollution problems. Equitable and reasonable utilization and 
the obligation not to cause significant harm are not fixed or assigned but rather negotiated.  
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3.2. The Variables  
3.2.1. The Geographic Imperative 
Recall that the goal of this paper is to explore the relationship between the geography of a water 
body and the terms of the agreement aimed at resolving conflict—that is to see if the observed 
variation in treaty outcomes can be explained by differences in geography. Surely, some of the 
differences are due to factors unrelated to spatial characteristics and geography, yet it seems 
reasonable to assume that part of the expected variation exists because different geographic 
forms of the commons are better governed under some regimes rather than others (Giordano 
Mark, 2003: 371-372).  
3.2.1.1. Broader Context: Geography and Bargaining Power 
According to the realist school of international relations, state power is largely made up of 
military capabilities (Claude, 1962: 6). Neo-realists also confirm that the ability to use force is a 
key to state power. Survival is the ultimate concern of states and military might the essence for 
achieving it. Similarly, the use of force is the ultimate means to influence the policies of other 
states (Waltz, 1979: 104, 113, 126 and 209). Even the classic negotiation school concurs, arguing 
that “power tends to rigidity in international negotiations, and total power tends to total rigidity” 
(Lall, 1966: 338).  
The more recent negotiation literature, however, disagrees. It considers the importance of 
issue-specific structural power (Habeeb, 1988: 18 and 145; Hopmann, 1998: 107). “Whereas 
aggregate structural power is concerned with an actor’s capabilities and position vis-à-vis the 
external environment as a whole, issue-specific structural power is concerned with an actor’s 
capabilities and position vis-à-vis another actor in terms of a specific mutual issue” (Habeeb, 
1988:18). In the context of negotiations over a shared river, upstream states may hold particular 
bargaining power not available to downstream states (Clarke, 1991: 94; Nunn, 1996: 173).  
This analysis is most compelling when an asymmetric power relationship exists between 
a militarily and economically powerful downstream country and a weaker upstream country as in 
the case of Lowi’s (1993) variant of hegemonic stability theory. The strong downstream country 
may have the military and economic power and may use it to influence and bully the upstream 
country yet the weaker upstream country is strategically located at the source of the river and 
may use its locational power accordingly in the bargaining process.  
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As Zartman and Rubin argue, the weaker state has something that the stronger state 
values but that the stronger state chooses not to take by stealth or force but rather by the give and 
take of negotiations. Alternatively, the stronger side is not strong enough {or does not deem 
efficient} to take what it wants by force and can do better by giving a sense of equality to the 
weaker side (Zartman and Rubin, 2000: 289). Therefore, while a downstream hegemon may play 
a role in the formulation of a cooperative regime, that hegemon, strong as it may be in terms of 
aggregate power, may not always be able to impose its will on other states in the formation of 
institutional arrangements (Zartman and Rubin, 2000: 2; Young, 1994: 128; Zartman, 1991: 66). 
As Young has observed: “those countries in possession of structural power will often find that 
they can achieve more by using their power to make promises and offer rewards than they can by 
relying on threats and punishments” (Young, 1994:135). The notion that a powerful country may 
have a greater need to develop a shared river but less of a need to negotiate a dispute with a 
weaker country affected by its development (Murphy and Sabadell, 1986:143) is, therefore, 
challenged. 
3.2.1.2. Geography, a State’s Interest in Negotiations, and Side-Payments 
Geography sets the context for bargaining (Waterbury, 1994: 40). The unidirectional feature of 
some rivers means that resolution of basin conflicts through mutual control of external effects 
that work reciprocally (as in the border-creator geography) is generally ruled out (Rogers, 
1993:118). Conversely, reciprocal externalities are the hallmark of common property resources 
(Dasgupta, Maler, and Vercelli, 1997:2) such as a border-creator river. It is because all parties 
do not necessarily have to bear the full economic consequences of their actions that the through-
border configuration confers certain powers on the upstream country (Durth, 1996: 62). 
Reciprocal externalities differ from unidirectional externalities in that there exists a direct means 
by which one party may punish or reward the other’s behavior, though not necessarily 
substantially (Barrett, 1994: 28).  
Given these two different geographical configurations, the incentives for cooperation 
may also be different. As Fox and LeMarquand (1979) have argued: “the potential uses for 
which a river can be managed and the location of developmental and use activities in relation to 
the location of political boundaries influence in a significant way what the incidence of benefits 
and costs will tend to be, and determine the kinds of arrangements that will be necessary to 
achieve what will be mutually regarded as an acceptable sharing of such benefits and costs.” 
(1979: 11)   
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  Considering pollution problems may be especially instructive, when comparing the 
incentives for negotiation between through-border and border-creator rivers. A downstream 
nation will likely ask for strict controls of water pollution caused by its upstream nation. In turn, 
upstream states may be far less inclined to take the problem seriously let alone to bear 
responsibility for devising an appropriate solution, than the downstream interest (Faure and 
Rubin, 1993: 22-23). In a situation of geographical asymmetry, those who want to change the 
status quo do not have the means to provide incentives to those interested in maintaining the 
status quo (Linnerooth, 1990: 641-643). To change the incentives, the downstream (the victim 
country) state may have to offer side-payments to the upstream state.  
The situation in a border-creator river is different. Pollution through wastewater 
effluents, for example, also affects the banks and territory of the country, which engages in 
pollution just as it affects the neighboring state. The incentive to abate pollution or prevent it 
before it is emitted into the water is thus intrinsic to the geography of the river. For this reason, 
pollution may be less of a problem for this kind of geography. In fact, side-payments need not be 
provided for abating pollution given that the problem is one of a reciprocal nature and not of a 
unidirectional nature—the externalities are at least partially internalized given the river 
geography. The geographically symmetrical relationship between the actors, at least in 
comparison to the through-border configuration, will also imply that development of the joint 
river will require the equal participation of both countries. In the border-creator case the 
incentive to reach agreement is to avoid the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the development of 
the river will not require one party having to entice the other. 
More can be said about property rights by considering the side-payment game. 
LeMarquand has argued, that while the polluter pays principle (PPP) has been acknowledged by 
the legal community as the morally accepted principle, the polluting state has a strong incentive 
to reject this principle since it would require the polluting country to abate its discharges at its 
own expense for its neighbor’s benefit (LeMarquand, 1977). In fact, the literature tells us that 
where upstream countries are degrading the river for use by the downstream countries, the 
downstream countries—contrary to prevailing opinion regarding the PPP—may have to pay for 
the cost of stopping the damaging activity (Fox and LeMarquand, 1979: 18; Faure and Rubin, 
1993: 23; Giordano Mark, 2003: 371).  
But tackling the geographically induced asymmetry is critical  (Haftendorn, 2000: 52, 62 
and 68) in all domains of water use such as hydropower, flood control and even access to water. 
Side-payments are again used to overcome the implicit geographical advantage and induce the 
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political will of upstream states (LeMarquand, 1981: 147-148; Rogers, 1993: 118). The aim here 
is to create a situation whereby the advantaged state may be compensated for giving up its 
relatively advantaged position (Haftendorn, 2000:64). The property right conflict, intrinsic to 
how the river shall be developed, will thus be resolved in the form of side-payments to upstream 
states in return for ‘downstream benefits’. The same may hold for projects that solely benefit 
downstream states but affect upstream states. To gain the accession of upstream states for the 
project, side-payments shall again be provided to the upstream state. The downstream state may, 
therefore, have the property right to construct the project but it must provide compensation to 
seal the deal, thus recognizing the upstream state’s property right to the river too. The 
compromise is again expressed in the form of side-payments. 
3.2.1.3. Concluding Remarks for Geography Section 
The analysis and literature review presented above provides a case for the role a river 
configuration may play in facilitating conflict or cooperation. In negotiations over an 
international river, the upstream state may therefore possess issue-specific structural power given 
that it controls the source of the river and the sights where most of the necessary projects can be 
built.  This issue-specific structural power may be especially instrumental when the downstream 
state is more powerful in military and economic terms but would rather negotiate with the 
upstream state given its advantageous physical position along the river. In any case, side-
payments may often have to factor into this geographically asymmetric situation. 
As also noted in the section above, international law doesn’t assign rights to shared 
resources unambiguously. By looking at the final allocations agreed to in a treaty, however, we 
can “back out” the implicit initial allocation. For example, if the downstream state pays the 
upstream state for all pollution control upstream, then the upstream state is essentially recognized 
as having the right to pollute. Similarly, the direction of side-payments will also tell us not only 
how cooperation may be fostered given the two configurations but how conflicting uses or even 
integrative uses, such as a joint project, of a given river are reconciled, provided that both states 
may have different visions for its utilization.  
Yet if only geography mattered, then treaty outcomes should be consistent between the 
through-border and border-creator configurations and treaty designs consistent between 
upstream and downstream states. That is, if only geography mattered, it would not be important 
that asymmetries characterized the relationship between basin states and the downstream state 
were richer or poorer than the upstream state. But this may not be the case. Environmental 
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problems are often characterized by large asymmetries across countries; both in terms of benefits 
received from abating and the cost of abating (Botteon and Carraro, 1997: 27). While the work 
here tries to distinguish itself from other work in the field by elaborating on the role of 
geography in negotiations over water and by focusing on two extreme geographical 
configurations, economic factors should also play explanatory roles.  
3.2.2. The Economic-Political Imperative 
3.2.2.1. Economic Asymmetry as a Bargaining Tactic: The Side-Payment Game 
The deficiencies of hegemonic stability theory in explaining cooperation, does not deny “the 
existence of asymmetries among parties in a given issue area both with respect to the intensity of 
their interest in the problem and with respect to the usable bargaining strength” (Young, 
1989:354).   
The literature on asymmetrical environmental negotiation deals with the limited resources 
and assets a poor nation can bring to bear relative to a richer nation. The premise is that an 
asymmetrical relationship may actually favor the poor state. Cooperation from the poorer 
country will ensue if the richer country provides economic and financial incentives (Sjostedt and 
Spector, 1993: 311-312). While the more asymmetric the power relationship, the more unequal 
the distribution of gains, it does not follow that the asymmetries of gains will always favor the 
stronger state—the malign view of the hegemon as a coercer. Indeed the opposite may be true 
more of the time—the benign view of hegemony (Milner, 1992:470). In this case the small 
member will gain proportionately far more benefit from the big member’s exertions than vice 
versa—the traditional view of hegemony in the international system is thus turned on its head 
(Snidal, 1985:581). 
The stronger state is, therefore, quite often able to provide weaker states benefits or 
compensation to induce their cooperation (Milner, 1992: 480). In the case of public goods, or 
reciprocal externalities, the big member may also find it worthwhile to provide all of the good 
regardless of whether the others contribute anything (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Russett and 
Sullivan, 1971: 853). The burdens borne and the sacrifice are, therefore, disproportionate. To be 
fair the stronger party still gains, yet it is not necessarily taken advantage of by the weaker 
parties or able to exercise its power over other states to its sole advantage. Instead, the 
relationship between weak and strong states, with asymmetric preferences for a normal good or 
with geographical discrepancies among them, should be considered as a relationship where the 
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strong states need entice the weaker state, or at least attain explicit consent from participants, to 
cooperate rather than forcefully compel them and impose a cooperative agreement (Young, 
1982:283).  
3.2.2.2. Differing Income Levels/Pollution Standards, Bargaining and Side-Payments 
Unlike the more optimistic discussion regarding the border-creator configuration above, others 
have argued that the combination of non-excludability and rivalness in consumption means that 
there is rather a stronger individual incentive to exploit common pool resources (Barkin and 
Shambaugh, 1999: 6). This is especially the case when the two states have different conceptions 
of time horizons vis-à-vis the resource (Barkin and Shambaugh 1999: 13 and 178). Of course, a 
state’s discount rate regarding a resource and its preferences for the environment, (which can be 
reflected in its pollution standards), is also a function of its economic well-being (Botteon and 
Carraro, 1997: 27). Poor countries may have more of a propensity to pollute to the detriment of 
wealthier countries with higher pollution standards. Conversely, positive links exist between 
income and environmental quality, being that there is an increased demand for environmental 
protection at higher incomes (Dasgupta and Maler, 1994: 4-5).   
As Hopmann has observed with regards to the outcomes of asymmetrical negotiations, 
the party that incurs the least losses associated with being left at the status quo point of no 
agreement will often be the favored party in the bargaining game (Hopmann, 1978: 162-163 and 
176). The country with the longer shadow of the future has a strong incentive to behave in a 
concessionary manner vis-à-vis the country with the shorter shadow of the future to secure an 
agreement (Barkin and Shambaugh, 1999:13). For developed countries, therefore, gaining the 
participation of developing states in international agreements has often required paying their 
participatory cost (Raustiala and Victor, 1998:696). 
According to Scott (1974: 842), states with a shorter shadow of the future for the resource 
have more bargaining power relative to those states with a longer shadow of the future vis-à-vis 
the resource and side-payments may often figure into to such a relationship. Negotiations among 
states with homogeneous preferences, such as the weight states give environmental issues, 
requires smaller transfers. Conversely, when constraints are imposed on transfers, mutually 
beneficial agreements may not exist, in particular if state preferences are very heterogeneous 
(Compte and Jehiel, 1997: 64). As such the ability to withstand losses, in this case a shorter 
shadow of the future, is a crucial element of bargaining power (Schelling, 1960: 22-23). 
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3.2.2.3. Economic Asymmetries, Pollution Standards, and ‘Good Will’ 
Financial capacities and prosperity enable wealthy governments to finance water quality projects 
in neighboring countries (Shmueli, 1999: 439). As the above section argued, poorer countries 
may also have different and perhaps weaker pollution standards than richer countries. As 
Linerooth has observed: “..the more developed upper riparian nations may wish to create ‘good 
will’ with their neighbors by contributing more to pollution control while benefiting less” 
(Linnerooth, 1990: 643). That is, financial aid and technological benefits can be transferred to 
remedy the environmental deficiencies emanating from underdevelopment. From a negotiating 
point of view, the rich country is willing to pay more even when it is upstream. This relationship 
between economically asymmetric countries may also transcend itself to other issues beyond 
pollution abatement.  
3.2.2.4. Concluding Remarks for Economic Section 
While the geography of a given river and the location of the riparian states along the river are 
important for explaining conflict and cooperation over international rivers and property right 
outcomes, they are not sufficient. If that was the case then variations in outcomes should not be 
different for cases with rich and poor riparians. Compared to less rich states, a richer nation not 
only has a higher willingness to pay for particular projects but, in cases of pollution, will have a 
lower threshold for accepting pollution. This reality should either reinforce the outcomes 
predicted by the geographic theory—given a richer downstream state, or perhaps even provide an 
opposite outcome to that predicted by the geographic theory—given a richer upstream state. 
 A similar scenario holds for economically asymmetric riparians situated along a river 
with a border-creator configuration. The richer nation may be able to take on the majority of the 
costs of a joint project or provide incentives to the poorer state for abating pollution. Despite the 
harm the poor state causes itself by polluting on a border-creator river, its threshold for 
accepting pollution is much higher than that of the richer state, given its shorter shadow of the 
future. 
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4. Testable Hypotheses and Results for Treaty Design Investigation 
The above theoretical discussion allows for four testable hypotheses: 
Ho(1): All else being equal, in the through-border configuration side-payments will be 
provided by the downstream state to the upstream state. 
  
Ho(2): All else being equal, in the border-creator configuration side-payments will not be 
provided and costs will be shared equally.  
 
Ho(3): All else being equal, for the through-border configuration, the richer is the 
upstream state relative to the downstream state, the smaller will be the side-payment paid 
by the downstream state. Instead, the upstream state may even provide side-payments to 
the downstream state.  
 
Ho(4): All else being equal, for the border-creator configuration, the richer state will 
provide side-payments to the poorer state, or bear a larger fraction of the joint costs of 
river development.  
 
I will test these hypotheses across the expanded set of treaty observations I have obtained and 
report the results in the next section. 
Among the 257 agreements obtained, assessed and catalogued, 9513 specific agreements 
were thoroughly analyzed for their content. Recall that it was only the specific agreements that 
spoke of particular actions to be taken by the states, which reflected on the issue of property right 
conflicts and their subsequent resolution, that are the main interest of this research. Table 1 
provides the number of specific agreements and total agreements analyzed for each 
configuration. 
Table 1: Treaties Collected According to Configuration 
Configuration Number of Specific Treaties Number of Treaties 
Through-border 38 109 
Border-creator 9 15 
Mixed 20 54 
Partial border-creator 20 53 
Border-creator but enters state 2 9 
Through-border * 2 3 13 
Partial border-creator but returns 1 3 
Mixed zig zag 1 1 
                                                 
13
 The 1931 Agreement on the Cunene River, albeit a specific agreement, was removed from the count because the 
text has not be identified and no clear actions or obligations are provided by the description of the treaty. So in reality 
94 specific agreements are considered for this portion of the study. 
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4.1. Through-Border Configuration 
           
                                 River and flow direction 
State A              
         
   
         
  Border     
State B    
 
I start with some descriptive statistics for the agreements pertaining to the through-border 
configuration. They are provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Through-Border Configuration 
Number of 
Specific 
Treaties 
Number of Specific 
Treaties without 
Side-payments 
Number of Specific Treaties 
with Side-payments from 
Downstream State to 
Upstream State 
Number of Specific Treaties with 
Side-payments from Upstream 
State to Downstream State 
38  11 (29%)  25 (66%) 2 (5%) 
 
As is obvious from Table 2 side-payments are a common strategic tool used in rivers of 
the through-border configuration. Perhaps even more interesting is that side-payment regimes 
are even more salient once the agreements are organized according to issue area. In fact the 
majority of agreements that pertain to water quantity—that is the division of water or rights to 
the water between the two states—do not evince side-payments from the downstream state to the 
upstream state. Below I divide the agreements according to issue area. Table 3 includes water 
quantity agreements. Table 4 includes agreements that pertain to hydropower, flood control, 
facility use, dam construction, and monitoring. Table 5 includes agreements that pertain to 
pollution issues.  Each table also indicates which country is richer or if the economic relationship 
between the countries is symmetric14. In each entry the year of the agreement is provided, 
                                                 
14
 I use the Penn World Table 6.1 to determine GDP per capita. When the Penn World Table 6.1 does not provide the appropriate 
data I use the Penn World Table 5.6 for both parties. For data before 1950 (which both Penn World Tables do not cover) I use 
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followed by the respective river, and followed by the upstream and then downstream country. 
The side-payment regime is also indicated.  An analysis follows these three tables.    
Table 3: Water Quantity Agreements 
Asymmetric Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Side-payments Symmetric Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Upstream 
Richer 
Downstream 
Richer No 
DN to 
UP15 
UP to 
DN16 
1909; St. Mary; US and 
Canada 
  X   
1914; Roya; France and 
Italy    X   
  
1925/1951; 
Gash; Eritrea 
(IT) and 
Sudan (UK) 
 X17  
  
1957; Isonzo 
(Mrzlek 
Springs), 
Yugoslavia 
and Italy  
 X  
1967; Roya; France and 
Italy     X 
1968; Lima; Spain and 
Portugal 
  X   
  
1973; 
Helmand; 
Afghanistan 
and Iran 
 X  
1975; Gangir; Iraq and Iran   X   
1975; Kanjan Cham; Iraq 
and Iran 
  X   
1975; Tib (Mehmeh); Iraq 
and Iran 
  X   
                                                                                                                                                             
Maddison, A., Monitoring the World Economy: 1820-1992, (OECD: Paris, 1995). In cases where the above three sources do not 
provide any data, I refer to the United Nations Statistical Databases, National Accounts Main Aggregates. For consistent 
comparisons within each country pair, GDP per capita for each pair is derived from the same source 
A relationship is considered asymmetric when the economic difference between the parties is at least two times. To obtain this 
threshold I began by rounding the GDP ratios for each year for all the observations considered. I round the ratio to obtain a better 
estimation of the GDP differences during the time when the treaty was negotiated rather than just appoint figure. In running a 
descriptive statistics test for all the ratio values obtained (raw values) I come up with a mean of 2.143—indicating that choosing 2 
times (after rounding) as the threshold for economic asymmetry is justifiable. For additional statistical assurance, I hypothesized 
that the raw and rounded values do not defer statistically.  The results that the two samples do not differ statistically. Finally, I am 
able to show statistically not only that two times the difference is the appropriate threshold for establishing asymmetry but also 
that two times the difference is most significant among all the other ratios beyond two times. Using two times the difference for 
referring to a relationship as asymmetric is therefore the best estimation. Using three times the difference or four times is not 
superior to using two times the difference. As Figure 5.1 demonstrates, the significance level drops as the possible thresholds 
increase beyond two times, becoming the least significant at five times the difference.  
15
 Side-payments from the downstream state to the upstream state. 
16
 Side-payments from the upstream state to the downstream state. 
17
 Payments were discontinued when the UK took over Eritrea in 1941. 
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Table 4: Hydropower, Flood Control, Facility Use, Dam Construction, and Monitoring Agreements 
Symmetric 
Relationship 
(GDP/capita) 
Asymmetric Relationship (GDP/capita) Side-payments 
 Upstream Richer Downstream Richer No DN to UP 
UP to 
DN 
  
1949; Reno di Lei; Italy and 
Switzerland 
 X  
1951; Naatamojoki; 
Finland and 
Norway 
 
 
 X  
1952; Orawa; 
Poland and 
Czechoslovakia 
 
 
 X  
1954/1966; Kosi; 
Nepal and India  
 
 
 X  
1955; Mont Cenis; 
France and Italy    X  
 
1958; Carol; France 
and Spain  
X   
1960; Mont Cenis; 
France and Italy 
 
 
 X  
1961/1964; 
Columbia, Canada 
and US 
 
 
 X  
1963; Garona; 
Spain and France 
 
 
 X  
1967; Skagit; 
Canada and US 
 
 
 X  
 
1972; Vuoksi; Finland 
and USSR  
 X  
 
 1974; Wangchu; Bhutan and India  X  
1984; Skagit; 
Canada and US  
 
 
 X  
1988; Red; US and 
Canada 
 
 
 X  
 
1989; Vuoksi; Finland 
and USSR  X   
1995;Kurichhu; 
Bhutan and India 
 
 
 X  
1996; Wangchu, 
Bhutan and India 
 
 
 X  
1955, Sarisu; 
Turkey and Iran 
 
 
X   
 
1960; Witka/Smeda; 
Czechoslovakia and 
Poland 
 
 X  
 
1963; Allaine; 
Switzerland and 
France 
 
  X 
  
2000; Talas; Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan 
 X  
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Table 5: Pollution Agreements 
Asymmetric Relationship (GDP/capita) Side-payments Symmetric 
Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Upstream Richer Downstream Richer No DN to UP UP to DN 
 
 1985; Tijuana; Mexico and US X   
  1990; Tijuana; Mexico and US  X  
  1997; Tijuana; Mexico and US  X  
  1997; Tijuana; Mexico and US  X  
  1980; New; Mexico and US X   
  1987; New; Mexico and US  X  
  1995; New; Mexico and US  X  
 
Specifically, I hypothesized that treaties corresponding to the through-border 
configuration shall evince side-payments from the downstream country to the upstream country 
so as to encourage cooperation or resolve a property right dispute (hypothesis 1). Side-payments 
are used to offset the geographical asymmetries between upstream and downstream states. This 
is the case in specific agreements, where the parties agree to a particular action or project such as 
pollution abatement, hydropower, flood control and even water allocation. For pollution issues, 
in particular, a richer downstream state, which has a lower propensity to accept pollution relative 
to a poorer upstream state’s ability to abate pollution, would have to provide side-payments to 
encourage cooperation.  Side-payments from the downstream country to the upstream country 
would also be forthcoming when a project downstream is built mostly for the benefit of the 
downstream country yet affects the territory of the upstream country.  Conversely, and given the 
geographical advantages bestowed on the upstream state, there shall be no immediate economic 
incentive for that state to internalize an externality flowing in the downstream direction. 
However, I hypothesized that the ‘willingness to pay’ of a richer state enables it to internalize the 
costs of abatement or of taking action that benefits a downstream state, when the economic 
incentive to do so are otherwise not clear—hypothesis 3. These economic discrepancies can 
explain outcomes that do not abide by the geographical hypothesis—specifically when an 
upstream country provides side-payments to the downstream country or undertakes actions on its 
behalf without a side-payment.  
 I was able to analyze thirty-eight specific agreements of the through-border 
configuration. 66% of these agreements incorporated side-payments from the downstream state 
to the upstream state.  
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The majority of agreements that pertained to water quantity and allocation did not 
incorporate side-payments from the downstream to the upstream state—these are not highlighted 
in Table 3. Only three agreements out of a total of ten agreements (30%) incorporated side-
payments from the downstream to the upstream country—these are highlighted in dark gray in 
Table 3. Thus, while several agreements incorporated side-payments for water allocation, the 
majority of agreements provided evidence to the contrary; illustrating that utilizing side-
payments to solve water allocation disputes is not too common. This phenomenon is not out of 
line with some other findings and claims about the notion of payment for water allocations (Wolf 
1999; McCaffrey, 2001: 264). In addition, in two cases, one with side-payment transfers from the 
downstream country to the upstream country (1957 Agreement on the Izonzo) and another with 
the opposite side-payment regime (1967 Agreement on the Roya, which is highlighted in light 
gray in Table 3), the agreements are water allocation treaties between specific towns. The 
agreements are therefore, not water allocation treaties between countries per se (such as the 
1925/1951 Agreement on the Gash and the 1973 Agreement on the Helmand). More salient 
evidence for the side-payment phenomenon, however, is provided in the other treaty issue areas. 
In the agreements that pertained to hydropower, flood control, monitoring, facility use, 
and pollution issues (ignoring the water allocation agreements), twenty-two out of twenty-eight 
agreements (79%) evinced side-payments from the downstream country to the upstream country. 
These are highlighted in dark gray in Tables 4 and 5. One agreement (3%) evinced side-
payments from the upstream to the downstream country (the 1963 Agreement pertaining to the 
Allaine River, which is highlighted in light gray in Table 4), while five other agreements (18%) 
evinced no side-payments at all—not highlighted in Tables 4 and 5.  
Of the twenty-two agreements that incorporated side-payments, six agreements pertained 
to works undertaken downstream for the main benefit of the downstream state yet which harmed 
the territory of the upstream state in some fashion. In all of these cases a side-payment is 
provided to ameliorate the harm upstream and to promote the acquiescence of the upstream state 
for the project. In two of these cases, the relatively richer country is also upstream, yet a side-
payment is still forthcoming. This phenomenon signifies that despite the economic asymmetry in 
favor of the upstream country, the geographic asymmetry between the two countries is better 
suited in explaining the outcome and the solution to the property right conflict on issues that 
relate to projects downstream, which harm the upstream state—hypothesis 1. Thus, even when a 
downstream state is relatively poorer, compared to its upstream riparian, a side-payment is still 
forthcoming—hypothesis 3, of course, does not deny this possibility.     
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The remaining sixteen agreements pertain either to works or actions undertaken upstream 
which also benefit the downstream state or the use of the upstream state’s strategic local for the 
construction of works that benefit both countries. The side-payment transfer in all these cases 
from the downstream state to the upstream state, again, suggests how divergent uses on a river 
are resolved and coordinated and how cooperation is facilitated in geographically asymmetric 
situations—hypothesis 1. While the majority of these agreements embody an economically 
symmetric relationship between the parties, seven of these agreements embody an asymmetric 
relationship between the parties. The downstream country is always the richer country. In fact, 
five of these agreements pertain solely to pollution abatement between the United States and 
Mexico. These five agreements signify that while the downstream state has a right not be harmed 
from pollution the upstream state has right to utilize its part of the river. Yet as is tangibly 
demonstrated in the outcomes of these agreements, the compromise is expressed through side-
payments in the upstream direction so as to facilitate the abatement. The economically superior 
downstream state, the United States, must provide a side-payment for abating pollution upstream 
since her tolerance for accepting pollution is much lower than Mexico, the upstream state. 
 Three agreements provide interesting insight and validation for hypothesis 3. The first, 
the 1963 Allaine River Agreement provides for side-payments from the upstream country to the 
downstream country. The final two agreements, the 1958 Carol River Agreement and the 1989 
Vuoksi River Agreement, do not provide for direct side-payments from the upstream country to 
the downstream country, but call on the upstream state to take action in favor of the downstream 
country—in a way a side-payment. As hypothesis 3, and the theory behind it, suggests, the 
outcome is a function of the upstream state’s ability to internalize the costs of its actions that 
affect or favor mostly the downstream state. In all these cases, the economic discrepancies 
between the two countries are twice the difference. Thus, hypothesis 3 can explain the instances 
where side-payment transfers take place from the upstream to the downstream state or where the 
upstream state takes actions that favor the downstream state without compensation. 
Two of the other agreements that do not incorporate side-payments are actually two 
additional pollution abatement agreements between the United States and Mexico. If considered 
in isolation of the five pollution agreements mentioned above, they would suggest that Mexico 
had an obligation to abate the pollution it was creating in favor of the United States given that 
this was the purpose of the two treaties—substantiating the PPP. Yet, when these two agreements 
are considered an integral part of the five above agreements, it can be ascertained that while 
Mexico was recognized as being the source of pollution on the Tijuana and New Rivers, the 
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United States had to be forthcoming with monetary incentives so as to assist Mexico in abating 
the pollution—confirming the VPP—a function of hypotheses 1. The last agreement (1955 
Agreement on the Sarisu) does not to incorporate any side-payments and calls on each of the 
parties to partake in their own monitoring activities—no actions are taken by one country that 
favor the other country. The agreement asserts that both countries shall establish monitoring 
stations on their own side of the border. 
4.2. Border-Creator Configuration 
State A 
         
   
                                                            
State B               
 
 
I start with some descriptive statistics for the agreements pertaining to the border-creator 
configuration. They are provided in Table 6. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Border-Creator Configuration 
Number of 
Specific 
Treaties 
Number of Specific 
Treaties without Side-
payments 
Number of Specific 
Treaties with Equal Cost-
sharing 
Number of Specific Treaties 
without Cost-sharing 
9 9 (100%) 6 (66%) 3 (33%) 
 
All the agreements that correspond to the border-creator configuration do not incorporate side-
payments. Similarly, the majority of the agreements embody an equal cost sharing regime among 
the parties. Given the small number of treaties, I do not divide the agreements into separate 
tables according to issue-area, as was the case in the through-border configuration section.  
Table 7 provides the agreements, the side-payment and cost-sharing regime. The economic 
relationship between the parties is also indicated. An analysis follows the table.  
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Table 7: Agreements for Border-Creator Configuration 
Side-payments Cost-sharing 
BENEFIT 
Symmetric 
Relationship 
Asymmetric 
Relationship N18 R to P19 
P to 
R20 N
21
 
EQ
22
 
NSI
23
 
R 
MR
24
 
P 
MR
25
 
EQ
26
 
NSI
27
 
R 
MR
28
 
P 
MR
29
 
1909; 
Niagara; US 
and Canada 
 X   X         
1941; 
Niagara; US 
and Canada 
 X   X         
1997; 
Curaim, 
Brazil and 
Uruguay 
 X   X         
1941; 
Niagara; US 
and Canada 
 
X 
   X        
1950; 
Niagara; US 
and Canada 
 X    X        
2000; An 
Nahr El 
Khabir; Syria 
and Lebanon 
 X    X        
1969; 
Niagara; US 
and Canada 
 X        X30    
1977; 
Yaguaron; 
Brazil and 
Uruguay 
 X    X        
1955; 
Karasu; 
Turkey and 
Iran 
 X    X        
The geographical hypothesis pertaining to the border-creator configuration, argued that 
given the geographical symmetry between the states, no side-payments would be required to 
                                                 
18
 No side-payments 
19
 Side-payments from rich country to poor country 
20
 Side-payments from poor country to rich country 
21
 No cost-sharing regime negotiated 
22
 Equal cost-sharing regime negotiated 
23
 Cost-sharing regime not specifically indicated 
24
 Rich country pays more of cost-burden 
25
 Poor country pays more of cost burden 
26
 Benefits accrued to each party determine cost of project—equal sharing. 
27
 Benefits accrued to each party determine cost of project—not specifically indicated 
28
 Benefits accrued to each party determine cost of project—rich pays more 
29
 Benefits accrued to each party determine cost of project—poor pays more 
30
 Two companies, one from Canada and the other from the United States, shall be entitled to half of the hydropower 
potential produced by the dam’s diversions. As such, they shall also contribute to the costs of the dam in equal 
shares. It is not indicated however, how the US and Canada will divide the costs of the dam between themselves.   
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encourage cooperation or solve-property right disputes. Instead, integrated projects would be 
taken on jointly and their associated costs equally shared—hypothesis 2. Similarly, pollution 
issues would be less of a problem given the retaliation and reciprocity embedded in the border-
creator configuration. Side-payments would also not have to be incorporated into the 
negotiations so as to encourage abatement. However, I hypothesized that exceptions to the 
outcomes predicted by the geographical hypothesis would be more likely when the respective 
states were economically asymmetric. That is, richer states not only have a higher ‘willingness to 
pay’ but, as suggested in the through-border case, also have a lower tolerance for accepting 
pollution relative to the capacity of the poorer state to pollute. Therefore, a richer state may have 
to provide a side-payment to the poorer state for abating pollution or perhaps take on a larger 
portion of the costs for the joint project—hypothesis 4. 
For the border-creator configuration I was able to analyze 9 specific agreements. All 
nine of the agreements (100%) did not incorporate side-payments between the parties—
hypothesis 2. All the parties to the agreements were also economically symmetric suggesting that 
cooperation and joint development of a border-creator river often requires the equal 
participation of both countries. However, given the symmetric relationship between the parties, 
the salience of hypothesis 4 could not be rigorously tested.   
The geographic symmetry between the parties also implies that side-payments did not 
have to factor in to the negotiations to encourage cooperation or solve property right conflicts 
since strategic local is immaterial.  In fact, of the nine agreements, six agreements (66%) 
pertained to a joint project whose costs were divided equally between the parties—they are 
highlighted in gray in Table 7. In essence for all the agreements that pertained to joint projects 
costs were always divided equally. The other three agreements were water allocation treaties and 
did not require any additional works or expenses—they are not highlighted in Table 7.  
It is noteworthy that in one of the agreements—1969 Agreement on the Niagara, it was 
specifically mentioned that the hydropower created by a joint dam would be equally divided 
between the two companies representing each country. It was also agreed that the costs these two 
companies would contribute would be equal—suggesting that the equal division of benefits 
determines the cost-sharing regime. But just as it seems that the division of equal benefits is the 
sole deciding factor in determining the cost-sharing regime of a joint project, it is important to 
heed the other agreements that do not speak at all to the benefits accrued to either party. In fact, 
it is sometimes quite difficult to determine how the benefits are divided. To ascertain the benefits 
derived from a project one would need to have information on the benefits derived from the 
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project in addition to the costs incurred from the project, an exercise that remains quite difficult 
especially when these measures are not specifically indicated. In addition, it is especially 
important to take note of the 2000 Agreement between Syria and Lebanon, where the water was 
divided unequally between the two states yet the costs of the respective project equally divided. 
Thus, even when benefits are divided unequally, the costs of a project on a border-creator river 
may still be divided equally—it as if the geography of a border-creator configuration provides a 
focal point for the parties.  Joint and integrated exploitation of the part of the river that flows 
along the common border necessitates the equal participation of both parties and the costs for 
that project are more often divided equally. 
Below I provide the results for the non-pure configurations. 
4.3. Other Configurations 
Although the theory and hypotheses presented above were based largely on the two pure 
configurations, the non-pure configurations embody physical characteristics of the pure 
configurations. As such testing the theory and hypotheses along the outlying data should provide 
comparable results, especially since stretches of the river of the non-pure configurations 
resemble the pure configurations. Thus, while the pure configuration and the non-pure 
configurations are technically different they share many similarities. Thus, while the pure 
configurations constitute the general model of which the other non-pure configurations are 
variations, comparing the characteristics intrinsic in each configuration can be very instructive 
and telling.   
Take for example the mixed and partial border-creator configurations in Appendix A. 
Like the through-border configuration, the mixed configuration constitutes a clear upstream 
country that has the geographic and strategic upper hand. However, like the border-creator 
configuration the mixed configuration constitutes a stretch of the river the forms the border 
between both countries. The partial border-creator configuration also constitutes a clear 
upstream country that has the geographic and strategic upper hand, albeit both countries are 
downstream. However, like the border-creator configuration, the two states also share a stretch 
of the border where projects may require bi-national participation. The other nine configurations 
share similar attributes, constituting either a country with the strategic upper hand, an upstream 
country, or a situation where the river forms the border between both countries.  
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It is therefore appropriate to divide the agreements and the corresponding rivers 
according to the stretch of the river that resembles most closely the physical phenomenon of each 
of the pure configurations and to further observe if the side-payment and cost-sharing regimes 
fall under similar patterns. 
There are about 50 specific agreements that fall under the non-pure configurations, which 
are assessed in Table 8.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Non-pure Configurations: Economic Asymmetries and Associated Side-Payment and Cost-Sharing Regimes 
Asymmetric Relationship (GDP/capita) Treaty-Border Side-payments Cost-sharing 
BENEFIT Symmetric Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Upstream Richer Downstream Richer 
Y
31
 
N
32
 
MX
33
 
NC
34
 
N
35
 
DN 
to 
UP
36
 
UP 
to 
DN
37
 
N
38
 
EQ
39
 
 
NSI
40
 
DN 
MR
41
 
UP 
MR
42
 
EQ
43
 
NSI
44
 
DN MR45 UP MR46 
 
1912; Duoro; Spain and 
Portugal 
    X X   X         
 
1912; Guadania; Spain 
and Portugal 
    X X   X        
 
 
1912; Tagus; Spain and 
Portugal 
    X X   X      
   
1935; 
Artibonite; 
Dominican 
Republic and 
Haiti 
     X X   X         
 
1944; Colorado; United 
States and Mexico 
  X    X  X         
                                                 
31
 Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border 
32
 Treaty does not pertain to the part of the river that flows along the border—part of the river wholly in the territory of the upstream country. 
33
 Treaty pertains to the part of the river that flows along the border and a part of the river wholly in the territory of the upstream country. 
34
 Treaty does not make it clear which part of the river the agreement applies to. 
35
 No side-payments 
36
 Side-payments from downstream country to upstream country 
37
 Side-payments from upstream country to downstream country 
38
 No cost-sharing   
39
 Equal cost-sharing regime 
40
 Cost-sharing not specifically indicated 
41
 Downstream pays more of the cost-sharing burden 
42
 Upstream country pays more of the cost-sharing burden 
43
 Cost-sharing is based on benefits received from the project; equal benefits therefore equal cost-sharing 
44
 Benefits and costs are not specifically indicated 
45
 Downstream country benefits more and pays more of the cost-burden share. 
46
 Upstream country benefits more and pays more of the cost-burden share. 
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Non-pure Configurations Continued 
 
Asymmetric Relationship (GDP/capita) Treaty-Border Side-payments Cost-sharing 
BENEFIT 
Symmetric 
Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Upstream Richer Downstream Richer Y N MX NC N 
DN 
to 
UP 
UP 
to 
DN 
N EQ NSI DN MR 
UP 
MR EQ NSI DN MR UP MR 
  
1957; Spol; 
Italy and 
Switzerland 
  X   X47  X         
1959; Gandak; 
Nepal and India 
    X   X  X         
1964; Duoro; 
Spain and 
Portugal 
  X    X   X         
 
1966; Colorado; United 
States and Mexico 
  X    X  X         
1968; 
Guadania; 
Spain and 
Portugal 
  X    X   X         
1968; Tagus; 
Spain and 
Portugal  
  X    X   X         
                                                 
47
 The Spol River is by far the most complex case of all the cases investigated in this dissertation. The Spol River begins in Italy, creates the border for a short 
distance and then enters into Switzerland. The dam built to create the reservoir (Livigno Reservoir) was built on the part of the border along where the river flows.  
The Swiss (through a concessionary) are responsible for the construction of the dam. The subsequent reservoir mostly inundates Italian territory. The reservoir 
supplies a chain of hydroelectric plants solely in Swiss territory. While the agreement is named after the Spol River the waters accumulating in the Livignio 
Reservoir also originate in Switzerland and flow into the Reservoir. Thus while Italy is upstream on the Spol, Switzerland is upstream on other rivers flowing into 
the reservoir such as the Val Mora. Another river that collects into the Reservoir is the Ova dal Gal. The river originates in Italy. Before the reservoir was built, the 
river flowed from Italy up towards the border with Switzerland. It then flowed along the border between the two countries and finally into the part of the Spol that 
creates the border between the two countries. After the reservoir was built the Ova dal Gal flowed directly into the reservoir. The geographical issues associated 
with this agreement are therefore quite complex. The agreement recognizes that Italy contributes water to the Reservoir, which is used to produce hydroelectricity 
in Switzerland. Therefore, Italy is owed a set amount of hydropower from Switzerland (36.5 mil KW/y) for free.  The agreement, however, is also made up of a 
second part. In this part of the agreement Italy is to build two reservoirs (San Giacomo and Cancano) and dams solely in its own territory for the creation of 
hydropower. However, 97 MCM/y of the waters flowing into the Livigno Reservoir that could have been used in Switzerland to create hydropower are diverted into 
the reservoirs. These waters are taken from the Ova dal Gal. For this reason Switzerland is entitled to a set amount of hydropower from Italy (128 million KWh/y). 
The balance of the energy owed to Italy and energy owed to Switzerland, however favors Switzerland. In fact, the inter-company agreement (agreement between 
the private companies exploiting the hydropower potential) has stated that Italy has a right to use the balance (given that it has the most need for it) for a payment.  
(Parts of this explanation are based on the 1957 Agreement; Interview, Schroter, 2004).   
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Non-pure Configurations Continued 
 
Asymmetric Relationship (GDP/capita) Treaty-Border Side-payments Cost-sharing 
BENEFIT 
Symmetric 
Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Upstream Richer Downstream Richer Y N MX NC N 
DN 
to 
UP 
UP 
to 
DN 
N EQ NSI DN MR 
UP 
MR EQ NSI DN MR UP MR 
 
 
1971; 
Puyango-
Tumbes; 
Ecuador and 
Peru 
   X X         X48   
1975; Duverij; 
Iran and Iraq  
     X X   X         
1983; Teesta; 
India and 
Bangladesh 
     X X   X         
 
1994; Colorado; US and 
Mexico 
 X    X       X49     
 
 
1995; Nestos; 
Bulgaria and 
Greece 
 X   X   X         
 
 
2000; Chu; 
Kyrgyzstan 
and 
Kazakhstan 
 X    X  X         
1966; Saar; 
France and 
Germany 
  X    X    X        
 
1970/1972; Torrente 
Breggia; Switzerland 
and Italy 
 X    X           X 
 
1972/1973; Colorado; 
US and Mexico 
  X   X   X         
 
                                                 
48
 The agreement only states that depending on the water quantities and power allotted to each side, the costs of the project shall be allocated accordingly. The 
agreement also states that the bi-national Project consists of Ecuador exploiting 50,000 hectares and Peru exploiting 20,000 hectares. This does not include 
(which would then change the cost-sharing regime) more land that may be exploited by both parties (by Peru: an additional 16,000 hectares) as may be indicated 
by future studies; this also includes power that can be derived and provided to each party. So the costs are not indicated, yet it is obvious that the costs are divided 
according to the benefit derived. 
49
 Each side will conduct the works on its own side of the border. The United States will also act to remove sediment in Mexico’s jurisdiction. 
 39
Non-pure Configurations Continued 
Asymmetric Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Treaty-Border Side-payments Cost-sharing 
BENEFIT 
Symmetric 
Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Upstream 
Richer 
Downstream 
Richer Y N MX NC N 
DN to 
UP 
UP to 
DN N EQ NSI 
DN 
MR 
UP 
MR EQ NSI DN MR 
UP 
MR 
 
1906; Rio 
Grande; US 
and Mexico 
 
X    X   X         
 
1933; Rio 
Grande; US 
and Mexico 
 
X    X           X 
 
1912; 
Chanza; 
Spain and 
Portugal 
    X X   X         
 
1912; 
Minho; 
Spain and 
Portugal 
    X X   X         
 
 
1926; Cunene; 
Angola 
(Portugal) and 
Namibia (South 
Africa) 
 X    X  X         
1938; Paz; 
Guatemala and 
El Salvador 
  
   X X   X         
  
1944, Zarumilla, 
Ecuador and 
Peru 
X50     X  X         
 
1944; Rio 
Grande; 
United 
States and 
Mexico 
 
X    X         X51   
 
1949; Prut; 
USSR and 
Romania 
 
X    X    X        
                                                 
50
 But this is a territorial agreement with reference to lands of the Zarumilla River. 
51
 The costs of building the international storage dams and other joint works shall be prorated between the two governments in proportion to their allocations and 
benefits. 
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Non-pure Configurations Continued 
Asymmetric Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Treaty-Border Side-payments Cost-sharing 
BENEFIT 
Symmetric 
Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Upstream Richer 
Downstream 
Richer Y N MX NC N 
DN to 
UP 
UP to 
DN N EQ NSI 
DN 
MR 
UP 
MR EQ NSI DN MR 
UP 
MR 
1957; Atrak; 
Iran and USSR 
  
X    X   X52         
1957; Atrak; 
Iran and USSR 
  
X    X    X        
1958; Timok; 
Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria 
 
 
X    X    X53        
 
 
1959; 
Hermance; 
France and 
Switzerland 
  X  X      X54      
1968; Chanza; 
Spain and 
Portugal 
  
X    X   X         
1968; Minho; 
Spain and 
Portugal 
  
X    X           X 
1969; Cunene; 
Angola 
(Portugal) and 
Namibia (South 
Africa) 
  
 X    X  X         
 
1971; Prut; 
USSR and 
Romania  
 
X    X    X55        
1986; Gander; 
Luxembourg 
and France 
  
X    X           X56 
                                                 
52
 The parties only agree to divide the water and power of the part of the river that forms the border equally. Joint projects are considered but no division of costs for these projects 
are mentioned.  
53
 Each party undertakes 50% of the joint project and uses its own funds to do so. 
54
 Costs are not specifically indicated and neither are the benefits. According to the works undertaken it is possible to ascertain that richer Switzerland takes on a higher cost-
sharing burden. France is only responsible for the works on the stretch of the river in her territory while Switzerland is responsible for all the works to be undertaken on the 
common stretch of the river. While both countries are to maintain the part of the river on their side of the border, Switzerland undertakes additional maintenance works on the part 
of the river that forms the border between the two states. Given that the emphasis of this treaty is on the part of the river the forms the border between the two states, I categorize 
this treaty with the agreements that pertain to works to be undertaken on the part of the river that forms the border.  
55
 While the parties have agreed to divide the energy and regulated volume of water there is no indication of how each benefits from the flood control works.   
56
 The project wholly benefits Luxembourg and her property and citizenry in France and this is why she pays the total costs. 
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Non-pure Configurations Continued 
Asymmetric Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Treaty-Border Side-payments Cost-sharing 
BENEFIT 
Symmetric 
Relationship 
(GDP/capita) Upstream 
Richer 
Downstream 
Richer Y N MX NC N 
DN to 
UP 
UP to 
DN N EQ NSI 
DN 
MR 
UP 
MR EQ NSI DN MR 
UP 
MR 
1998; Zarumilla, 
Ecuador and 
Peru 
  
X57    X    X        
 
1956; 
Argun; 
USSR and 
China 
 
X    X    X        
 
1956; Amur; 
USSR and 
China 
 
X    X    X        
 
 
1958; Amu 
Darya; 
Afghanistan and 
USSR 
X    X      X      
1961/1964; 
Kootenay; 
Canada and US 
   
X    X           
1989; Souris 
River; Canada 
and US 
  
 
X    X           
1930; Chut de 
Chatelot (Doubs 
River); France 
and Switzerland 
  X    X   X         
 
 
1920; Mahakali; 
Nepal and India 
(Sarada) 
 
X    X           
1992; Mahakali; 
Nepal and India 
(Tankapur) 
  
 
X    X           
  
1996; Mahakali; 
Nepal and India 
(Pencheshwar) 
X     X        X   
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 See http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/98021713_lpo.html , http://www.landminesurvivors.org/documents/indicator_peru.pdf  
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The table is divided as follows. Those agreements not highlighted are either treaties 
that make no reference to side-payments or cost-sharing, such as water allocation agreements, 
or those that do not provide enough information on how the costs are to be divided among the 
parties.58 Those agreements highlighted in light gray refer to treaties where the richer party 
takes on the heaviest burden of the cost allocation, for projects built on the common stretch of 
the river, or where the upstream country takes on specific actions in its own territory that 
benefit the downstream state—the richer state being upstream. Those agreements highlighted 
in dark gray refer to treaties where the project is built strictly in the territory of the upstream 
state or where the project mostly affects the strategic territory of the upstream state—side-
payments are always provided from the downstream state to the upstream state. Finally, those 
agreement highlighted in the darkest shade of gray refer to treaties that divide the costs of the 
project equally among the parties. The project is built on the stretch of the river that creates 
the border between the two states.    
Below, I provide some general statistics only for the agreements that clearly outline 
side-payment and cost-sharing patterns or that provide enough information to discern this 
relationship.59 The information is categorized according to the stretch of the river where the 
agreed upon project or task is to be undertaken. The economic asymmetries between the 
parties are also considered. Twenty-eight agreements are relevant.  
4.3.1. The Upstream State’s Stretch of the River 
In general, out of the twelve agreements60 that refer to a project built on the stretch of the river 
flowing solely in the territory of the upstream state, or where the project affected mostly the 
territory of the upstream state (resembling the through-border configuration), 92% of these 
agreements evince side-payments from the downstream state to the upstream state. The 
outcome not only corresponds to the expectations of hypothesis 1 of the pure configurations 
but, as with the through-border configuration, the result also demonstrates that downstream 
benefits created by upstream works are often recognized (i.e., rewarded) through 
compensation and side-payments transferred upstream. The compromise to the property right 
                                                 
58
 Although not highlighted the 1968 Minho Agreement is part of the count below. It was not highlighted since it 
did match any of the clear shading categorizations.  The 1986 Gander Agreement is not a joint project between 
the parties and is therefore nothighlighted—see footnote 56. The 1944 Zarumilla Agreement is also not 
highlighted—see footnote 50. 
59
 Here I ignore the cost-benefit assessment outlined in a treaty, if one is indeed provided, and group all the 
agreements that pertain to the respective stretch of the river in the same category.  
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dispute and the coordination of the river’s uses between the parties is expressed through side-
payments. Two of the agreements within this category also posit an outcome whereby 
payments would be provided if the water deliveries made downstream were used for gain 
rather than just subsistence purposes. These two examples can be included among the rare, 
but not uncommon, occurrences of compensation for water allocation.    
Among the cases under discussion, two treaty outcomes relevant to both hypotheses 1 
and 3 should be noted. Recall that hypothesis 3 does not deny that a poor downstream state 
might need to provide a side-payment to a richer upstream state to offset a geographical 
asymmetry. In fact, both agreements illustrate the rich upstream state undertaking actions that 
benefited the downstream state, while the compensation owed the upstream state, was 
conditional. Thus, while side-payments from the downstream to the upstream state were 
certainly an element of the agreement, such payments were qualified and could be reduced or 
eliminated depending on specified circumstances. 
However, only one agreement embodying a richer upstream state, out of a total of 
three agreements embodying a richer upstream riparian (33%), evinces an outcome where the 
upstream state took action in favor of the downstream state without compensation—a 
circumstance that might be regarded as a side-payment. Indeed, the countries were 
economically asymmetric, with the upstream state the richer riparian. As hypothesis 3 
suggests, the higher ‘willingness to pay’ of the upstream state moderated its disincentives to 
cooperate. The costs of taking action despite the disincentives to do so were, therefore, 
internalized.  
Interestingly, this tenth case, the 1973 Agreement on the Colorado River, is also a 
favored example of the issue-linkage literature, which analyzes the agreement by 
hypothesizing that other issues of interest provided the impetus for America’s cooperative 
stance toward Mexico. No such information is available in the agreement itself.  On the other 
hand, the economic asymmetry explanation (hypothesis 3) affords a better explanation of the 
outcome of that 1973 Agreement by referring to the treaty itself and the parties involved. 
4.3.2. The Stretch of the River that Flows Along the Common Border 
In terms of projects and tasks to be undertaken only on the part of the river that flows along 
the common border (and resembling the border-creator configuration), sixteen agreements 
                                                                                                                                                        
60
 I include the 1920 Sarada Agreement and the 1992 Agreement on the Tankapur Project as two separate 
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are relevant.61 Specifically, eleven of these agreements embody two asymmetric riparians. 
Interestingly, 33% of these agreements provide for an equal cost-sharing regime while 63% 
provide that the larger cost-sharing burden is borne by the richer country. In one agreement 
the richer state also provides a side-payment to the poorer state. As expected, the majority of 
agreements pertaining to asymmetric parties evince a cost-sharing regime, which calls on the 
richer party to assume the bulk of the cost burden.  
Among the five agreements that embody symmetric riparians, 80% of the agreements 
provide for an equal sharing of costs—hypothesis 2. The final agreement divides the costs 
unequally.62  
For the most part, projects and tasks to be undertaken on the part of the river that 
flows along the common border require the equal participation of the parties. Side-payments 
are not required. Asymmetry between the states matters, however, with the richer country 
taking up the higher cost-sharing burden most of the time. To some extent, therefore, even in 
the non-pure configurations, the geography of the stretch of the river flowing along the border 
acts almost as a focal point for joint projects and the respective equal participation of each 
country.  
                                                                                                                                                        
agreements, which are also part of the 1996 Mahakali Agreement. 
61
 I ignore the following agreements (a brief explanation is provided in the parenthesis after the agreement): 1971 
Puyango-Tumbes Agreement (no specific costs specified); 1944 Zarumilla Agreement (this is a border shift 
agreement); 1944 Rio Grande Agreement (costs are not specified); 1986 Gander Agreement (not a joint project); 
1930 (Doubs River) Chut de Chatelot Agreement (agreement does not specify costs, responsibilities, or 
obligations).  
62In general, I also ignore water allocation agreements that do not evince tasks or obligations, and thus costs or 
side-payments, from this general analysis: 1912 Duoro Agreement, 1912 Guadania Agreement, 1912 Tagus 
Agreement, 1935 Artibonite Agreement, 1964 Duoro Agreement, 1968 Guadania Agreement, 1968 Tagus 
Agreement, 1975 Duverij Agreement, 1983 Teesta Agreement, 1995 Nestos Agreement; 1912 Chanza 
Agreement, 1912 Minho Agreement, 1938 Paz Agreement, 1957 Atrak Agreement, and 1968 Chanza Agreement; 
1909 Milk River Agreement.  
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5. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
The main aim of this paper was to demonstrate that the analysis of property right conflicts 
over shared international rivers is best accomplished by looking at the actual treaties states 
negotiate. Property rights are poorly defined and international water law only provides states 
with hints and suggestions as to how to coordinate uses of a shared river. Surely international 
water law does not aspire to prescribe specific guidelines, but its tenants are so vague that 
identifying patterns in negotiated treaties provide better insight as to how states actually 
negotiate their international water disputes.  
The large number of agreements over water allows for such a systematic analysis. It 
also allows for hypotheses testing across a large set of observations. Principally, the side-
payment or cost-sharing regime of each individual treaty was the main unit of analysis for 
ascertaining how the property right conflict is resolved and how cooperation ensues—the 
dependent variable of this paper. International agreements governing a river shared by only 
two states were the focus of the research.  
This paper began with a short survey of conflict and cooperation in the context of 
hydropolitics and international relations. This discussion set the stage for understanding how 
side-payments make up an integral part of the strategic interaction approach of the 
hydropolitical cooperation game in addition to other elements, such as reciprocity and issue-
linkage. Most importantly, I argued that while concerns for security and survival may play an 
inhibiting role vis-à-vis cooperation, mutuality of interest, fostered by scarcity, combined with 
the inadequacies of autonomous and unilateral strategies are the main underlying causes for 
cooperation. In addition, I argued and demonstrated that the realist contention that hegemony 
is often required for the emergence of cooperation is not the case for international rivers. Even 
an upstream state, which is the hegemon in the river basin may still elect to cooperate despite 
the disincentives to do so—strategic interaction may explain the reasons for cooperation. 
Similarly, and as the many treaties that were analyzed signaled, even symmetric63 countries 
elect to cooperate and negotiate. Their impetus is to obtain joint gains. Yet, where geographic 
asymmetries exist, such as in the case of the through-border river, strategic-interaction, and 
specifically side-payment transfers from the geographically weaker downstream state to the 
geographically superior upstream state, may again explain the reasons for cooperation.  
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Finally, the brute power that may be used by a militarily superior riparian to sway or 
bully a militarily weaker country was also argued to be futile in negotiations over water.  This 
may be especially salient in cases where the militarily superior country is downstream and is 
dependent on the geographically superior upstream state for the construction of specific 
projects. Issue-specific structural power, the advantageous geographical position, possessed 
by the upstream country is instrumental in negotiations over water. As such, militarily and 
economically superior countries may be better served by negotiating with weaker states, 
providing them a sense of equality, and providing promises and rewards rather than making 
threats and punishments.    
The next section expounded on the role of side-payments and cost-sharing regimes in 
the investigation of treaty design differences. In all, the main thrust of the paper has been to 
test the geographic contention that property right regimes are commons related. That is, there 
should be a difference in the outcomes of treaties that govern rivers that fall under different 
physical configurations, mainly the through-border and border-creator configurations. 
However, given that richer states have different propensities to pay than poorer states, 
economic asymmetries among states should also matter. Therefore, geographical and 
economic-political consideration made up the independent variables of this study.  
The analysis of the two pure configurations provided the basis for this research 
agenda. The great majority of agreements pertaining to the through-border configuration 
evince side-payments—indicating not only that property right disputes are often solved via 
side-payments from the downstream to the upstream country but that the coordination of uses 
along a river are subject to side-payments for benefits created downstream. In pollution cases, 
the compromise between the PPP and the VPP was also demonstrated in side-payments—the 
victim country had to pay to promote abatement.  
Where the opposite side-payment scenario was evinced, the upstream state was always 
the richer party. Similarly, when actions taken upstream were conducted for the sole benefit 
of the downstream state without compensation, the upstream state was also richer. As the 
theory developed by this paper suggests, not only does a richer state have a higher willingness 
to pay but this willingness to pay also allows the richer state to internalize the costs of 
projects that benefit mostly the downstream state. The disincentives to cooperate are, 
therefore, mitigated.  
                                                                                                                                                        
63
 Symmetry here is based on economic criteria. 
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Agreements corresponding to the border-creator configuration did not evince side-
payments. Naturally, projects were always to be pursued on the parties’ common border and 
equal participation was demonstrated in all cases—even when the benefits were not divided 
equally among the parties. Property right conflicts in the border-creator configuration are 
usually solved by equal participation by the parties and side-payments are less needed for 
inducing cooperation. In fact, even though the notion of costs and benefits (not rigorously 
pursued by this paper) often factor into determining how costs are shared, it was concluded 
that these calculations are often hard to ascertain, are not indicated by the agreement, or are 
not related to one another at all.  
The geographical and economic hypotheses were also tested on the non-pure 
configurations. Most fascinating was that outcomes for an agreed upon task or project were 
guided by the corresponding stretch of the river where the project was to be undertaken and 
its relationship to the pure configurations. If the project was to be built in the upstream state’s 
stretch of the river (or where the upstream state generally provided its strategic territory), the 
downstream benefits created upstream were always recognized by side-payments in the 
upstream direction. Economic differences also played an important role with the richer 
country paying the majority of the costs for projects undertaken on the stretch of the river that 
flows along the common border. In cases whereby projects were undertaken upstream in favor 
of the downstream state, without compensation, the upstream state was always richer. 
By focusing on rivers shared by only two states this study has surely ignored the 
extensive number of rivers shared by more than two countries and has therefore restricted the 
scope of its direct application. However, it has done so in order to gain clarity. Focusing on 
rivers shared by only two states makes analysis methodologically simpler. Similarly, once 
initial broader conclusions and patterns can be formulated for the bilateral case, the analysis 
can then be extended in later research to take account of the qualities intrinsic in multilateral 
settings. That said, there is no reason that certain policy implications can’t be relevant for 
rivers shared by more than two states as they are for rivers shared by only two states—
especially in the case of upstream/downstream situations where geographical asymmetry is 
present.  
 48
5.1. Policy Implications 
This study has attempted to formulate a theoretical basis for explaining how water 
treaties differ in their design and how agreements over shared rivers are negotiated and 
concluded. In this context, the work has also reflected on the larger issue of conflict and 
cooperation over shared international rivers. Extending beyond the theoretical foundation of 
this work, empirical applications and tests were also conducted across a large spectrum of 
data. Thus, despite the uniqueness of each water problem, patterns in international water 
treaties are discernable and these patterns can be studied systematically. The empirical testing 
of the theory provides some interesting policy implications for states currently in conflict over 
a specific shared river or for mediators (whether they be individuals or other states) 
attempting to foster cooperation among river riparians.       
Perhaps the most compelling insights may be provided to states negotiating over a 
through-border river. Recall that it is by no means certain that conflict in the use of a 
through-border river is inevitable, but the geography of a through-border river helps by 
facilitating conflicts of interest, at least in comparison with the border-creator river. For this 
reason I will focus on the former river configuration in this discussion. 
As past precedent has shown, in upstream-downstream situations side-payments are 
more likely to factor into negotiated agreements for the coordination of hydropower, flood-
control uses, and pollution control of a given river. While not as common as the former three 
issue-areas, water quantity disputes and the subsequent resolution between upstream and 
downstream states may also require side-payments. Most importantly, it is located on the 
headwaters of the river and could, at least theoretically, block the flow of the river into the 
downstream country. All else being equal, the upstream state is geographically superior. It 
often owns the sites where flood control facilities can be built, where dams for hydropower 
generation can be located, where reservoirs for water collection can be placed, and where 
pollution control—given upstream pollution—can be instituted.  
As such projects that take place in the upstream state’s stretch of the river, including 
the construction of reservoirs and dams, or that require the territory of the upstream state, and 
which also benefit the downstream state, are often recognized through side-payments in the 
upstream direction. This phenomenon better coined as compensation for downstream benefits 
created upstream is true across different continents and between both developing and 
developed countries. Therefore, countries currently undergoing conflict over a shared 
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through-border river may find it most practical to institute side-payments so as to overcome 
the intrinsic asymmetry and come to an acceptable solution of their impending property right 
dispute. 
Side-payment regimes may be deemed most instrumental for alleviating pollution 
disputes. Despite the normatively accepted PPP, downstream states may have to contribute to 
the abatement of pollution, which originates upstream. Given their superior geographical 
position and the unidirectional nature of the externality, upstream states will be less inclined 
to abate the pollution without appropriate incentives.      
However, as this paper has demonstrated, the economic discrepancies between the 
states may make a difference. When a rich upstream state is negotiating with a poorer 
downstream state, the side-payment outcome may be reversed. In other cases no side-
payments are provided at all yet the rich upstream state may take on actions that benefit 
mostly the downstream state and provide little benefit to it. The higher GDP per capita not 
only signals greater willingness to pay on the part of the rich country but also assuages its 
disincentives to cooperate when most of the benefits flow downstream as a function of its 
actions.      
As demonstrated by the many cases analyzed in this study, side-payments are a most 
acceptable means for solving property right disputes in geographically asymmetric situations. 
Contrary to the claim that side-payments are rare because states perceive them as a bribe 
(Bennett, Ragland, and Yolles, 1998; Folmer, Mouche, and Ragland, 1993) or fear gaining the 
reputation of a weak negotiator (Maler, 1990:86), compensation is a common panacea for 
international river disputes. 
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APPENDIX A: GEOGRAPHICAL CONFIGURATIONS FOR RIVERS SHARED BY TWO 
STATES  
 
Below you will find the 13 configurations identified.  
 
1. Through-Border     2. Border-Creator   
 
  
                            River and flow directions 
State A       State A 
         
   
         
      Border  
State B       State B 
 
 
 
3. Mixed     4. Through-Border but Creates Border 
 
State A      State A 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
State B      State B    
      
 
 
 
5. Partial Border-Creator   6. Partial Border-Creator but Returns 
       
 
                   State A                                                  State A 
 
 
 
 
 
State B      State B 
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7. Through-Border *2     8. Partial Border-Creator *2 
State A 
 
        State A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State B       State B 
 
 
 
 
9. Border-Creator but Enters State  
 
 
State A 
 
 
 
 
State B 
 
 
 
10. Partial Border-Creator *2 But Enters State Second  
 
State A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State B 
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11. Partial Border-Creator * 2 But Enters State First 
 
 
State A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State B 
 
 
 
12. Partial Border-Creator But Returns But Then enters Other State  
 
 
State A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State B 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Mixed Zig Zag  
 
 
State A 
 
 
 
 
  
State B 
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APPENDIX B: A GAME THEORETIC PRESENTATION OF A CONFLICTVE GAME 
VIS-À-VIS AN INTERNATIONAL RIVER AND A SECOND GAME WHICH INCLUDES 
SIDE-PAYMENTS, PRODUCING A COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM  
 
Below I present two games with two players: State A and State B. The first game will point to 
a conflictive equilibrium. No side-payments are introduced as an option. The second game 
considers side-payments as an option for use by State B. The game points to two equilibria: a 
conflictive one and a cooperative one. While the assumptions made determine the 
equilibrium, the second game demonstrates that a cooperative outcome can come about given 
the side-payment option available to State B.  
 
GAME 1: The Conflictive Nature of Water 
 
 
 
 
B1 
 Status Quo (SQ) 
B2 
 Block Navigation 
(BN) 
A1   
Status Quo (SQ) 
 
0 , 0 
 
-E , F 
A2 
Dam River (D) 
 
L , -K 
 
S , R  
 
Given a through-border configuration; State A is upstream and State B is downstream. State 
A thrives mostly on industry and industrial production. B thrives mostly on commerce and 
trade.  
 
Assume that State A has two possible actions: status quo and damming the river so as to 
produce hydroelectricity for its industries.  
 
Assume that State B has two possible actions: status quo and blocking State A from 
navigating the river so as to promote its own navigation fleet and reduce congestion on its part 
of the river. 
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If State A dams the river and State B does not block navigation State B is harmed because the 
dam is built not in coordination with State Bs concerns. It will therefore obtain a negative 
payoff. However, if State A dams the river and State B blocks navigation (say as retaliation) 
State B is harmed because the dam is not built in coordination with State Bs concerns. 
However, State B still gains a positive payoff because it mostly profits from navigation and 
now has a monopoly over the river’s navigation.  Of course this pay off is smaller compared 
to if State A does not dam the river and State B still blocks navigation. 
 
If State B blocks navigation, and State A does not dam the river, State A is harmed because 
State A can’t send its trading ships downstream. It will therefore gain a negative payoff. 
However, if State B blocks navigation and State A dams the river (say to produce 
hydroelectricity), State A is still harmed because it can’t send its trading ships downstream 
but still gains a positive payoff given that it mostly profits from industrial production and can 
provide electricity to its factories given the new dam. Of course this pay off is smaller 
compared to if State B does not blocks navigation and State A still dams the river. 
 
Process of the game; four possible scenarios in this game: 
 
*(A1, B1)—State A and State B take no action to harm the other; hence payoffs of 0 , 0. 
These values are normalized for comparison with the other values in the matrix. 
 
*(A1, B2)—if State A takes no action and State B blocks navigation; then A receives a 
negative payoff given that it can not send ships to the ocean and deliver goods by boat and 
because it does nothing to retaliate and make some gain (E > 0); B receives a positive payoff 
now because B has, say, a monopoly of the river and the specific trade route and also 
congestion of the river is stopped  (F > 0). 
 
*(A2, B1)—if A dams the river and B does nothing; then A receives hydroelectricity it can 
produce from the storage of the dam (L > 0); B receives a negative payoff given that the dam 
is built without coordination with B and it affects the flow of the river into B. Also B does 
nothing to retaliate and attain some gain (K>0). 
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*(A2, B2)—if A dams the river and B blocks navigation; then A still obtains a positive payoff 
because A relies less on navigation for trade (S>0); B also obtains a positive payoff because B 
relies more heavily on trade (R>0). However the payoffs are smaller compared to when one 
state does nothing and the other state proceeds with their action (damming the river or 
blocking navigation).  
 
The Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies is A2, B2 (where 0<R<F and 0<S<L). This is a 
classic conflict game where, given their possible actions, both countries do best by not 
cooperating. However, it is not of a prisoner’s dilemma type, since they get more by not 
cooperating than in the status quo. 
 
Now consider a game tree where A moves first. We shall fold the tree backwards and see 
what A’s preferred strategy is given B’s preferred strategy. 
 
               A 
 
 
 
                                           SQ    Dam 
 
 
                                 B          -E ,F           S, R  B 
 
          SQ   BN   SQ      BN 
 
 
 
               0 , 0      -E , F       L , -K                    S , R 
 
 
As also illustrated in this game tree by folding the tree backwards, A will dam the river and B 
Stop Navigation.  
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Now consider a game tree where B moves first. We shall fold the tree backwards and see 
what A’s preferred strategy is given B’s preferred strategy. 
 
               B 
 
 
 
                                           SQ    BN 
 
 
                                 A          -K, L            R, S  A 
 
          SQ                  Dam             SQ                Dam 
 
 
 
                0 , 0       -K , L       F , -E                   R , S 
 
 
Even if State B moves first and State A moves second, the solution is still that State B will 
block navigation and State A dam the river. 
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GAME 2: The Side-Payment Game 
 
Now consider a game where side-payments are introduced as a third option for State B to 
employ in dealing with upstream State A. Therefore, State A’s options are the status quo and 
damming the river. State B’s options are the status quo, blocking navigation, and providing 
side-payments so that the damming of the river is done in coordination with State B’s desires 
(with the side-payment option State B also gains some hydroelectricity produced by the dam).  
I will display this game only as an extended game rather than a normal form game. 
The reason is as follows. It is perfectly possible/logical that State B may want to provide a 
side-payment to State A for not building a dam and harming her. However, in the normal 
form game, where by definition both parties choose their strategies independently of each 
other, the game does not describe this option appropriately.  It is, therefore, important to make 
this game an interactive one to include threats and promises. And for simplicity, I will keep 
the State B’s option of side-payments limited only to State As decision to build the dam 
cooperatively.    
Consider a game tree where State A moves first. I shall fold the tree backwards and 
see what State A’s preferred strategy is given State B’s preferred strategy. In this game I will 
add an interaction component by including a threat by State A to build a dam unilaterally for 
hydroelectricity purposes, inaction by State B given the threat, a retaliatory threat by State B 
to block the river’s navigation, and an offer by State B to provide side-payments to State A so 
that the dam be built in coordination with State Bs concerns (and where State B will attain 
some hydroelectricity from the dam). Finally, additional choices will also be available to State 
A given the choices made by State B such as backing down from building the dam given State 
Bs threat to block navigation, damming the river despite State Bs threat to block navigation, 
accepting the offer of side-payments and building the dam in coordination with State B, and 
rejecting the offer of building the dam in coordination with State B. Of course, if State A 
rejects the offer of side-payments from State B, State B will block navigation.   
Below I provide an illustration of two possible equilibria (a cooperative one and a 
conflictive one) given that under certain conditions some utilities may be greater than other 
utilities or smaller than these same utilities—this depends on how the states assesses their 
utilities. The utilities that become susceptible to different valuations by the states, and hence 
producing different equilibria, are utilities S and Y and R and U. Given that this game is 
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illustrative and intuitive, attempting to draw a broad picture of the situation, rather than tied to 
actual numbers of costs and benefits, it must acknowledge all possible outcomes.  
Specifically, whether State A prefers utility Y to utility S depends on whether it sees 
the compromise of building a dam with State B’s concerns in mind as trumping the option of 
building the dam without coordination with State B and having its ships blocked by State B.     
In general utility U= 0+C-P (where 0 is not blocking navigation, C is State Bs value of 
the dam built cooperatively, and P is the side-payment provided to State A). Whether utility U 
is greater than or smaller than utility R depends on whether C-P is greater than or smaller than 
utility R. 
Despite the two possible equilibria presented below this game demonstrates that with 
the side-payment option a cooperative outcome can be attained. 
 
Equilibrium #1: Cooperative Outcome                                                                           
                                                                                A  
 
 
    
                             SQ                                           Announces to build a dam unilaterally                     
 
 
                                                                                                               B   
                             0 , 0                                                      Y ,U                                                                          
                  
 
                                                                            SQ    threatens to BN                 SP  
                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                      
                                                                  L, -K                  S , R         A                 Y,U         A 
 
                             
                                                                                        Back down      D      Accept       Reject 
              offer          offer  
                                                                                                                        (coop.)    (uncoop.) 
 
                                                                                         
                                                                              0 , 0                  S , R     Y , U                   S, R           
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As illustrated in this game tree by folding the tree backwards, the cooperative equilibrium is 
attainable. State A will accept the offer of side-payments from State B and dam the river in 
coordination with State B since Y>S. Y>S because State A is not harmed by the blocking of 
navigation, when accepting the side-payment offer, but rather attains side-payments and 
benefits from hydropower production. Folding the tree backwards, State B will provide side-
payments to State A since the status quo option provides a negative payoff and U>R.  U>R 
because State B obtains higher benefits given that the dam project built by State A is 
coordinated with State Bs desires and therefore the flow of the river water does not harm it or 
its navigation fleets. Folding the tree backwards one last time demonstrates that State A will 
dam the river since Y>0.  
 
Below I will investigate the conflictive equilibrium. 
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Equilibrium #2: Conflictive Outcome 
                                                                                A  
 
 
 
    
                             SQ                                           Announces to build a dam unilaterally                     
 
 
                                                                                                              B   
                            0 , 0                                                      S , R                                                                            
                  
 
                                                                                SQ     threatens to BN             SP  
                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                      
                                                                    L , -K               S , R        A                S , R         A 
 
                             
                                                                                      Back down        D      Accept       Reject 
                                                                                                                         offer           offer                          
                                                                                                                         (coop.)   (uncoop.)       
 
                                                                                     0 , 0                S , R       Y , U             S, R 
 
 
 
As illustrated here, another possible outcome is a conflictive one. Here State A dams 
the river and State B blocks navigation. Here S>Y because State A perceives the 
unilateral option of building the dam without taking account of State Bs concerns as 
the better alternative—also the river is blocked and State A can not send its ships 
downstream. Folding the tree backwards again, State B has no other option but to 
block navigation since it will not provide side-payments to State A for rejecting its 
offer of building the dam cooperatively. 
